Features
Elite resistance to colonial rule : A continuing debate
By Uditha Devapriya

The British takeover of the Kandyan Kingdom in 1815 led to a long period of resistance to colonial rule. Theoretically armed revolts against the British government ended in 1848, but popular expressions of resistance, couched more in symbols and propaganda than in armed insurrections, continued well into the mid-20th century. Having suppressed the traditional elite, to the extent of eradicating many of their families, the colonial government therefore chose to co-opt a section in it. The turning point was the 1848 rebellion, which alerted to officials the need to cultivate an intermediate class between the State and the masses. Their reasoning, essentially, was that lack of aristocratic authority had made the peasantry more amenable to insurrectionists and pretenders to the Kandyan Throne.
The traditional elites co-opted and appointed to positions such as the Ratemahattaya were different to the traditional elites that had been suppressed if not eliminated after the British annexation of Kandy. They hailed from a secondary layer, which had been subservient to the native chiefs. The process of their co-option worked out at three levels. Firstly, they were cultivated and lavishly patronised by the British government, in the form of land grants or knighthoods. Secondly, many of these families sent their children, who themselves followed their vocation, to elite English-medium schools, particularly those in Colombo, Galle, Kandy, and Jaffna. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, the British government more or less made government employment contingent on fealty to the British Crown and conversion to Anglicanism. The result was that a secondary elite that had been subservient to the Kandyan king and a number of chiefs shifted their loyalty to the British government.
A corollary of these shifts in official positions on the Kandyan aristocracy was a shift in attitudes to the social relations which had governed the Kandyan regions before the intrusion of colonialism. The British never abolished the institutions that had governed those relations: it was simply not in their interest to change them overnight. Yet, as Asoka Bandarage has noted in Colonialism in Sri Lanka, British officials were moved by a mixture of humanitarian ideals and self-interest to abolish some of the more oppressive features of those institutions, like caste. On these issues, the British governors themselves displayed little consistency: some were in favour of abolition, others were not. Ultimately, however, the 1848 rebellion led to a pivotal shift, to the extent that the State “perceived the threat posed by the erosion of aristocratic authority and took steps to restore it.”
Newton Gunasinghe has observed, correctly, that these policies prevented the emergence of a local bourgeoisie. Such developments instead benefitted an intermediate, subservient secondary elite, whose interests were in line with the British State, and who were hardly motivated to break up the social relations that they were now able to reassert, thanks to their newfound colonial patrons. Debates rage over the extent to which British colonialism implanted capitalism in Sri Lanka and the extent to which it prevented capitalism from emerging fully here. Yet as far as the growth of a secondary native elite is concerned, it is clear that colonial policies had the effect of stunting rather than encouraging the growth of capitalism. That was as true of the Kandyan regions as it was in the low country: in those regions, too, colonial policies benefitted either British officialdom or minority trade groups. Against such a backdrop, the native elites were hardly capitalist.
The role played by the native elites that were co-opted into the ranks of a subservient class remains controversial. This is so for two reasons. Firstly, if we take the adage that history never really happens, but is instead written and invented, then most accounts of the elite class that joined forces with the British are likely to be false, if not embellished. A corollary of this is that much of the popular literature on the elite families, in Sinhala, frames them as fervent opponents if not critics of colonialism, who used every proverbial trick in the book to subvert rather than advocate the policies of the British state, particularly in their regions. Secondly, and in my view more importantly, native elite interests may have been aligned with British colonial interests, but they were also, at one level, at variance with them. The character of this native elite class, and their relations with British colonialism, thus remains for me one of the more fascinating aspects of colonial history in Sri Lanka.

It goes without saying that relations between these two groups were fraught with contradictions. These stemmed, in part, from the quasi-feudal setup within which the co-opted elites operated: on the one hand they had to follow the orders of the colonial State, and on the other they had to maintain their leadership in their respective dissaves. The two goals did not always align with each other. Villagers would very often oppose colonial rule, particularly to taxation or corvee labour, while the headmen’s obligation was to the colonial State whose policies the villagers criticised and occasionally revolted against. The problem for the historian and anthropologist here is simple: given these contradictions, which side did the headmen take? Some would argue that they took the people’s side while declaring fealty to the British Crown, and others would argue they were unconditionally loyal to the latter. My contention is that it was possible, given the limits within which they worked, for headmen to be loyal both to the colonial State and to the people.
How so? The simplest answer is that it was in the British government’s own interest for village headmen to be seen as legitimate authority figures in their areas. The British had learnt, at an exorbitant cost, the consequences of subverting traditional authority during the 1848 rebellion. Subsequently, they set themselves to work in collaboration with the newly co-opted elite while promoting the (convenient) fiction that the latter’s duty to their people even surpassed their responsibility to the British State. For their part the elite realised the benefits of maintaining such a fiction: it helped them reinforce their authority in the villages, while carrying on good relations with British officialdom. Flipping this argument, we can hence say that popular expressions of anticolonial resistance forced the British government to use the elite classes, not to suppress people, but to make them pass off as legitimate representatives of the people. This task was arguably carried forward more discernibly in the highlands than in the Maritime Provinces, where 300 years of European colonialism had somewhat tempered the anticolonial tendencies of the people.
That said, it’s a little farfetched to draw a line between the low country and the up-country when it comes to popular and elite opposition to the British Crown. The same complexities can be discerned in both regions. Take the profusion of colonial symbols, like Dutch tiles and the portrait of Victoria, in the houses and residences of the native elites. Such symbols can be seen on the floors of Buddhist temples and the inner courtyard of at least one Sinhalese manor. Regarding the rationale for these symbols at temples, the head priest at Randombe Viharaya, in Ambalangoda, told me that people wished to express their resistance to British colonialism while perambulating the inner chamber and paying respects to the Buddha. The problem here is that such symbols adorn the entrances to these institutions as well. To this the Head Priest’s reply was that these temples were built with the aid of the British Crown, and that their founders wished to pay their respects to it. Note the logic: the symbols at the entrance, like Victoria’s portrait, denote loyalty to the British State, while the symbols along the floors in the inner sanctum denote repudiation of that same State.
The logic that dominates low country temples like the Randombe Viharaya dominates the residences of upcountry elites. I am of course talking about the Maduwanwela Walauwa here. At the inner courtyard of the Manor, one comes across, and invariably steps on, a tile bearing the portrait of the archetypal British monarch, Victoria. On the surface it suggests resistance to, and repudiation of, colonial authority. This version is more or less accepted by everyone, including the Archaeology Department: when I visited the Walauwa last year, the Department staff at the Walauwa carefully pointed out to me not just the image of Victoria on the floor, but also the Dutch tiles leading to the entrance, as evidence of his opposition of colonial rule. I am not in disagreement with such a thesis. On the other hand, though, we must note that these elites, if they wanted to maintain their position, had to be loyal to the colonial State and had to convert to Anglicanism. To be sure, they may have been nominal Christians, or “Rice Christians.” But that doesn’t resolve the paradox between loyalty to and repudiation of colonial authority which one comes across at the Walauwa.
One can argue either of two things here: that the Dissave was a lackey of the British Crown or that he played a double-game with the colonial State. I would agree with the latter view, but would also contend that there was no real contradiction between these two ideals, of fealty to the colonial State and fealty to the people. I would also contend that the so-called anticolonial symbols in the Walauwa are not anticolonial at all. They are what they are, tiles and mosaics bearing the dominant motifs of British rule, including a portrait of the British monarch. One can argue that stepping on them is hardly an act of reverence, but to a local, even a headman, stepping on them would hardly constitute disrespect, so long as these images have no religious, specifically Buddhist, connotations. Of course, Westerners may see things differently, but then the elites themselves probably did not: to them, placing the likeness of the British monarch, even on the floor, would have been reverential.
While the historical evidence we have may bear out these conclusions, however, it is more difficult to ascertain how the elite classes, and their families, themselves responded to these contradictions. As the sole, legitimate link between the State and the people, how did they see themselves? We know that they showed one face to colonial officials and another to their villagers. But in the great divide between these two groups – British officialdom and the indigenous peasantry – which side did they take? It is somewhat naïve to assume that they waited on the fence. Fundamentally, they were Anglicised and Westernised and they owed their careers, and their wherewithal, to the British Crown. But they were placed in such high positions by virtue of their ability to converse with their people, to handle their affairs and to represent them. It was a two-way street. Did they remain in the middle? The problem here is functional: us history writers are not psychoanalysts. We know how people behaved, but we have no idea about how they thought.
Perhaps the observation of a friend of mine can help us here: on his way out of the Maduwanwela Walauwa, he chortled to me that even if the anticolonial symbols inside were really anticolonial, “those officials could not possibly have minded them, I mean how could mere tiles pose a threat to the British Crown?” This is as insightful an interpretation as any I have heard, and it sits in with encounters between the Dissave and British officials: for instance, Herbert Wace, then Assistant Government Agent at Sabaragamuwa, is reported to have got on very well with him. Such encounters may baffle those who read into symbols like tiles and mosaics, but really, to me, the logic is simple: to the British Crown, superficial displays of resistance to the British Crowd did not matter in their larger scheme of co-opting and flattering the native elites – and keeping them in their payroll.
The writer is an international relations analyst, researcher, and columnist who can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com.
Features
The heart-friendly health minister
by Dr Gotabhya Ranasinghe
Senior Consultant Cardiologist
National Hospital Sri Lanka
When we sought a meeting with Hon Dr. Ramesh Pathirana, Minister of Health, he graciously cleared his busy schedule to accommodate us. Renowned for his attentive listening and deep understanding, Minister Pathirana is dedicated to advancing the health sector. His openness and transparency exemplify the qualities of an exemplary politician and minister.
Dr. Palitha Mahipala, the current Health Secretary, demonstrates both commendable enthusiasm and unwavering support. This combination of attributes makes him a highly compatible colleague for the esteemed Minister of Health.
Our discussion centered on a project that has been in the works for the past 30 years, one that no other minister had managed to advance.
Minister Pathirana, however, recognized the project’s significance and its potential to revolutionize care for heart patients.
The project involves the construction of a state-of-the-art facility at the premises of the National Hospital Colombo. The project’s location within the premises of the National Hospital underscores its importance and relevance to the healthcare infrastructure of the nation.
This facility will include a cardiology building and a tertiary care center, equipped with the latest technology to handle and treat all types of heart-related conditions and surgeries.
Securing funding was a major milestone for this initiative. Minister Pathirana successfully obtained approval for a $40 billion loan from the Asian Development Bank. With the funding in place, the foundation stone is scheduled to be laid in September this year, and construction will begin in January 2025.
This project guarantees a consistent and uninterrupted supply of stents and related medications for heart patients. As a result, patients will have timely access to essential medical supplies during their treatment and recovery. By securing these critical resources, the project aims to enhance patient outcomes, minimize treatment delays, and maintain the highest standards of cardiac care.
Upon its fruition, this monumental building will serve as a beacon of hope and healing, symbolizing the unwavering dedication to improving patient outcomes and fostering a healthier society.We anticipate a future marked by significant progress and positive outcomes in Sri Lanka’s cardiovascular treatment landscape within the foreseeable timeframe.
Features
A LOVING TRIBUTE TO JESUIT FR. ALOYSIUS PIERIS ON HIS 90th BIRTHDAY
by Fr. Emmanuel Fernando, OMI
Jesuit Fr. Aloysius Pieris (affectionately called Fr. Aloy) celebrated his 90th birthday on April 9, 2024 and I, as the editor of our Oblate Journal, THE MISSIONARY OBLATE had gone to press by that time. Immediately I decided to publish an article, appreciating the untiring selfless services he continues to offer for inter-Faith dialogue, the renewal of the Catholic Church, his concern for the poor and the suffering Sri Lankan masses and to me, the present writer.
It was in 1988, when I was appointed Director of the Oblate Scholastics at Ampitiya by the then Oblate Provincial Fr. Anselm Silva, that I came to know Fr. Aloy more closely. Knowing well his expertise in matters spiritual, theological, Indological and pastoral, and with the collaborative spirit of my companion-formators, our Oblate Scholastics were sent to Tulana, the Research and Encounter Centre, Kelaniya, of which he is the Founder-Director, for ‘exposure-programmes’ on matters spiritual, biblical, theological and pastoral. Some of these dimensions according to my view and that of my companion-formators, were not available at the National Seminary, Ampitiya.
Ever since that time, our Oblate formators/ accompaniers at the Oblate Scholasticate, Ampitiya , have continued to send our Oblate Scholastics to Tulana Centre for deepening their insights and convictions regarding matters needed to serve the people in today’s context. Fr. Aloy also had tried very enthusiastically with the Oblate team headed by Frs. Oswald Firth and Clement Waidyasekara to begin a Theologate, directed by the Religious Congregations in Sri Lanka, for the contextual formation/ accompaniment of their members. It should very well be a desired goal of the Leaders / Provincials of the Religious Congregations.
Besides being a formator/accompanier at the Oblate Scholasticate, I was entrusted also with the task of editing and publishing our Oblate journal, ‘The Missionary Oblate’. To maintain the quality of the journal I continue to depend on Fr. Aloy for his thought-provoking and stimulating articles on Biblical Spirituality, Biblical Theology and Ecclesiology. I am very grateful to him for his generous assistance. Of late, his writings on renewal of the Church, initiated by Pope St. John XX111 and continued by Pope Francis through the Synodal path, published in our Oblate journal, enable our readers to focus their attention also on the needed renewal in the Catholic Church in Sri Lanka. Fr. Aloy appreciated very much the Synodal path adopted by the Jesuit Pope Francis for the renewal of the Church, rooted very much on prayerful discernment. In my Religious and presbyteral life, Fr.Aloy continues to be my spiritual animator / guide and ongoing formator / acccompanier.
Fr. Aloysius Pieris, BA Hons (Lond), LPh (SHC, India), STL (PFT, Naples), PhD (SLU/VC), ThD (Tilburg), D.Ltt (KU), has been one of the eminent Asian theologians well recognized internationally and one who has lectured and held visiting chairs in many universities both in the West and in the East. Many members of Religious Congregations from Asian countries have benefited from his lectures and guidance in the East Asian Pastoral Institute (EAPI) in Manila, Philippines. He had been a Theologian consulted by the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences for many years. During his professorship at the Gregorian University in Rome, he was called to be a member of a special group of advisers on other religions consulted by Pope Paul VI.
Fr. Aloy is the author of more than 30 books and well over 500 Research Papers. Some of his books and articles have been translated and published in several countries. Among those books, one can find the following: 1) The Genesis of an Asian Theology of Liberation (An Autobiographical Excursus on the Art of Theologising in Asia, 2) An Asian Theology of Liberation, 3) Providential Timeliness of Vatican 11 (a long-overdue halt to a scandalous millennium, 4) Give Vatican 11 a chance, 5) Leadership in the Church, 6) Relishing our faith in working for justice (Themes for study and discussion), 7) A Message meant mainly, not exclusively for Jesuits (Background information necessary for helping Francis renew the Church), 8) Lent in Lanka (Reflections and Resolutions, 9) Love meets wisdom (A Christian Experience of Buddhism, 10) Fire and Water 11) God’s Reign for God’s poor, 12) Our Unhiddden Agenda (How we Jesuits work, pray and form our men). He is also the Editor of two journals, Vagdevi, Journal of Religious Reflection and Dialogue, New Series.
Fr. Aloy has a BA in Pali and Sanskrit from the University of London and a Ph.D in Buddhist Philosophy from the University of Sri Lankan, Vidyodaya Campus. On Nov. 23, 2019, he was awarded the prestigious honorary Doctorate of Literature (D.Litt) by the Chancellor of the University of Kelaniya, the Most Venerable Welamitiyawe Dharmakirthi Sri Kusala Dhamma Thera.
Fr. Aloy continues to be a promoter of Gospel values and virtues. Justice as a constitutive dimension of love and social concern for the downtrodden masses are very much noted in his life and work. He had very much appreciated the commitment of the late Fr. Joseph (Joe) Fernando, the National Director of the Social and Economic Centre (SEDEC) for the poor.
In Sri Lanka, a few religious Congregations – the Good Shepherd Sisters, the Christian Brothers, the Marist Brothers and the Oblates – have invited him to animate their members especially during their Provincial Congresses, Chapters and International Conferences. The mainline Christian Churches also have sought his advice and followed his seminars. I, for one, regret very much, that the Sri Lankan authorities of the Catholic Church –today’s Hierarchy—- have not sought Fr.
Aloy’s expertise for the renewal of the Catholic Church in Sri Lanka and thus have not benefited from the immense store of wisdom and insight that he can offer to our local Church while the Sri Lankan bishops who governed the Catholic church in the immediate aftermath of the Second Vatican Council (Edmund Fernando OMI, Anthony de Saram, Leo Nanayakkara OSB, Frank Marcus Fernando, Paul Perera,) visited him and consulted him on many matters. Among the Tamil Bishops, Bishop Rayappu Joseph was keeping close contact with him and Bishop J. Deogupillai hosted him and his team visiting him after the horrible Black July massacre of Tamils.
Features
A fairy tale, success or debacle
Sri Lanka-Singapore Free Trade Agreement
By Gomi Senadhira
senadhiragomi@gmail.com
“You might tell fairy tales, but the progress of a country cannot be achieved through such narratives. A country cannot be developed by making false promises. The country moved backward because of the electoral promises made by political parties throughout time. We have witnessed that the ultimate result of this is the country becoming bankrupt. Unfortunately, many segments of the population have not come to realize this yet.” – President Ranil Wickremesinghe, 2024 Budget speech
Any Sri Lankan would agree with the above words of President Wickremesinghe on the false promises our politicians and officials make and the fairy tales they narrate which bankrupted this country. So, to understand this, let’s look at one such fairy tale with lots of false promises; Ranil Wickremesinghe’s greatest achievement in the area of international trade and investment promotion during the Yahapalana period, Sri Lanka-Singapore Free Trade Agreement (SLSFTA).
It is appropriate and timely to do it now as Finance Minister Wickremesinghe has just presented to parliament a bill on the National Policy on Economic Transformation which includes the establishment of an Office for International Trade and the Sri Lanka Institute of Economics and International Trade.
Was SLSFTA a “Cleverly negotiated Free Trade Agreement” as stated by the (former) Minister of Development Strategies and International Trade Malik Samarawickrama during the Parliamentary Debate on the SLSFTA in July 2018, or a colossal blunder covered up with lies, false promises, and fairy tales? After SLSFTA was signed there were a number of fairy tales published on this agreement by the Ministry of Development Strategies and International, Institute of Policy Studies, and others.
However, for this article, I would like to limit my comments to the speech by Minister Samarawickrama during the Parliamentary Debate, and the two most important areas in the agreement which were covered up with lies, fairy tales, and false promises, namely: revenue loss for Sri Lanka and Investment from Singapore. On the other important area, “Waste products dumping” I do not want to comment here as I have written extensively on the issue.
1. The revenue loss
During the Parliamentary Debate in July 2018, Minister Samarawickrama stated “…. let me reiterate that this FTA with Singapore has been very cleverly negotiated by us…. The liberalisation programme under this FTA has been carefully designed to have the least impact on domestic industry and revenue collection. We have included all revenue sensitive items in the negative list of items which will not be subject to removal of tariff. Therefore, 97.8% revenue from Customs duty is protected. Our tariff liberalisation will take place over a period of 12-15 years! In fact, the revenue earned through tariffs on goods imported from Singapore last year was Rs. 35 billion.
The revenue loss for over the next 15 years due to the FTA is only Rs. 733 million– which when annualised, on average, is just Rs. 51 million. That is just 0.14% per year! So anyone who claims the Singapore FTA causes revenue loss to the Government cannot do basic arithmetic! Mr. Speaker, in conclusion, I call on my fellow members of this House – don’t mislead the public with baseless criticism that is not grounded in facts. Don’t look at petty politics and use these issues for your own political survival.”
I was surprised to read the minister’s speech because an article published in January 2018 in “The Straits Times“, based on information released by the Singaporean Negotiators stated, “…. With the FTA, tariff savings for Singapore exports are estimated to hit $10 million annually“.
As the annual tariff savings (that is the revenue loss for Sri Lanka) calculated by the Singaporean Negotiators, Singaporean $ 10 million (Sri Lankan rupees 1,200 million in 2018) was way above the rupees’ 733 million revenue loss for 15 years estimated by the Sri Lankan negotiators, it was clear to any observer that one of the parties to the agreement had not done the basic arithmetic!
Six years later, according to a report published by “The Morning” newspaper, speaking at the Committee on Public Finance (COPF) on 7th May 2024, Mr Samarawickrama’s chief trade negotiator K.J. Weerasinghehad had admitted “…. that forecasted revenue loss for the Government of Sri Lanka through the Singapore FTA is Rs. 450 million in 2023 and Rs. 1.3 billion in 2024.”
If these numbers are correct, as tariff liberalisation under the SLSFTA has just started, we will pass Rs 2 billion very soon. Then, the question is how Sri Lanka’s trade negotiators made such a colossal blunder. Didn’t they do their basic arithmetic? If they didn’t know how to do basic arithmetic they should have at least done their basic readings. For example, the headline of the article published in The Straits Times in January 2018 was “Singapore, Sri Lanka sign FTA, annual savings of $10m expected”.
Anyway, as Sri Lanka’s chief negotiator reiterated at the COPF meeting that “…. since 99% of the tariffs in Singapore have zero rates of duty, Sri Lanka has agreed on 80% tariff liberalisation over a period of 15 years while expecting Singapore investments to address the imbalance in trade,” let’s turn towards investment.
Investment from Singapore
In July 2018, speaking during the Parliamentary Debate on the FTA this is what Minister Malik Samarawickrama stated on investment from Singapore, “Already, thanks to this FTA, in just the past two-and-a-half months since the agreement came into effect we have received a proposal from Singapore for investment amounting to $ 14.8 billion in an oil refinery for export of petroleum products. In addition, we have proposals for a steel manufacturing plant for exports ($ 1 billion investment), flour milling plant ($ 50 million), sugar refinery ($ 200 million). This adds up to more than $ 16.05 billion in the pipeline on these projects alone.
And all of these projects will create thousands of more jobs for our people. In principle approval has already been granted by the BOI and the investors are awaiting the release of land the environmental approvals to commence the project.
I request the Opposition and those with vested interests to change their narrow-minded thinking and join us to develop our country. We must always look at what is best for the whole community, not just the few who may oppose. We owe it to our people to courageously take decisions that will change their lives for the better.”
According to the media report I quoted earlier, speaking at the Committee on Public Finance (COPF) Chief Negotiator Weerasinghe has admitted that Sri Lanka was not happy with overall Singapore investments that have come in the past few years in return for the trade liberalisation under the Singapore-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement. He has added that between 2021 and 2023 the total investment from Singapore had been around $162 million!
What happened to those projects worth $16 billion negotiated, thanks to the SLSFTA, in just the two-and-a-half months after the agreement came into effect and approved by the BOI? I do not know about the steel manufacturing plant for exports ($ 1 billion investment), flour milling plant ($ 50 million) and sugar refinery ($ 200 million).
However, story of the multibillion-dollar investment in the Petroleum Refinery unfolded in a manner that would qualify it as the best fairy tale with false promises presented by our politicians and the officials, prior to 2019 elections.
Though many Sri Lankans got to know, through the media which repeatedly highlighted a plethora of issues surrounding the project and the questionable credentials of the Singaporean investor, the construction work on the Mirrijiwela Oil Refinery along with the cement factory began on the24th of March 2019 with a bang and Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe and his ministers along with the foreign and local dignitaries laid the foundation stones.
That was few months before the 2019 Presidential elections. Inaugurating the construction work Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe said the projects will create thousands of job opportunities in the area and surrounding districts.
The oil refinery, which was to be built over 200 acres of land, with the capacity to refine 200,000 barrels of crude oil per day, was to generate US$7 billion of exports and create 1,500 direct and 3,000 indirect jobs. The construction of the refinery was to be completed in 44 months. Four years later, in August 2023 the Cabinet of Ministers approved the proposal presented by President Ranil Wickremesinghe to cancel the agreement with the investors of the refinery as the project has not been implemented! Can they explain to the country how much money was wasted to produce that fairy tale?
It is obvious that the President, ministers, and officials had made huge blunders and had deliberately misled the public and the parliament on the revenue loss and potential investment from SLSFTA with fairy tales and false promises.
As the president himself said, a country cannot be developed by making false promises or with fairy tales and these false promises and fairy tales had bankrupted the country. “Unfortunately, many segments of the population have not come to realize this yet”.
(The writer, a specialist and an activist on trade and development issues . )


