WHEN INFORMATION BECOMES INTELLIGENCE

by Merril Gunaratne

The investigations which followed the Easter Sunday carnage in 2019 gave rise to considerable speculation and inquiry concerning the manner in which the State Intelligence Service (SIS) handled information received from India about plans of the National Thowheed Jamath (NTJ) to commit terror strikes. The manner in which those handling as well as receiving such information at various levels sought to shift responsibility may have culminated in considerable confusion in the mind of the observer.

I therefore thought it apt to discuss the essential differences between ‘information’ and ‘intelligence’ because therein appears to lie the clue to identifying why the public have been left in a state of confusion. In fact when appearing before the Presidential Commission, I had the opportunity to clarify the essential differences between ‘information’ and ‘intelligence’.

ESSENTIAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ‘INFORMATION’ AND ‘INTELLIGENCE’

All sleuths in intelligence agencies including the SIS, the premier agency, commence their careers by being taught to discern the difference between information and intelligence. An intelligence career cannot advance without absorbing this fundamental lesson. When an informer provides a piece of information, the officer has to test whether it is suitable to be converted into intelligence. In other words, an intelligence officer has to determine whether the information is credible or reliable.

This test requires the sleuth to take cognizance of the previous record of the informer, and whether he had previously been consistent with procuring and providing reliable information. The officer has also to check abundant records of subversives and terror groups available in the subject and personal files stored in the “Registry” of the SIS to buttress his convictions further.

Once satisfied about the credibility of the piece of information received, his next step would be to put it down on paper. He would, in the same document, assign reasons why he believes the information received to be credible. This is done to convince those above him in the hierarchy to whom he would be reporting of the credibility of what is submitted. We call this part of the report ” assessment or analysis”, where the reasons adduced would help convince the recipient that the information is credible, and should be viewed seriously.

A piece of information can therefore emerge as “Intelligence” only if the writer can offer reasons to convince his superior of the credibility of information. I would quote from the book ‘Army of Evil’ by Adrian Weale to illustrate the point at which information converts to intelligence: “Broadly speaking, intelligence is information that is gathered and analyzed before informing decisions. Without the crucial analysis step, it is of no value”.

To express this in simple terms, the officer has to first satisfy himself about the credibility of the information received. He then converts it to intelligence. In fact the CIA sent officers in 2002 to help SIS officers here to polish the art of analysis by setting up an ” Analytic Unit”. It helped improve our ‘analytical’ capabilities considerably.

The process of ‘marketing’ the product (Information) begins at the point the officer prepares the intelligence report embodying his assessment . In the case of the SIS, the first such classified report has necessarily to be despatched to the president, with a copy to secretary of defence. Depending on the nature of intelligence, copies may also be sent to the IGP (as should have been the case with Easter Sunday), secretary to president, minister of defence and the service chiefs. Such highly classified reports have necessarily to embody intelligence, not mere scraps of untested information replete with ambiguity which the highly placed recipients will not bother to waste their time on.

If the intelligence in a report is of a grave and urgent nature, the SIS has to simultaneously alert the president, the secretary of defence and the IGP (as in the case of Easter Sunday) on the telephone without any delay. In the matter of intelligence pertaining to the terror plans of National Thowheed Jamat for Easter Sunday, the point could also have been made that an immediate discussion was warranted. The SIS had to act as the spur to goad, galvanize and energize the recipients to believe the intelligence and swing into action immediately. The process commences with the despatch of INTELLIGENCE Reports to the president and secretary of defence, the IGP etc, and would extend towards addressing them on the phone as well.

SIS RESPONSE TO INFORMATION FROM INDIA

Did the SIS deviate from established standards? The memo sent by Chief of National Intelligence( CNI) on behalf of secretary of defence to IGP dated April 9, 2019 refers to attacks planned on ‘some important churches’, and the ‘Indian High Commission’. To his letter was attached an unsigned note of the SIS where the modes of attack, and the leading figures of the NTJ have also been reflected. At paragraph four, this note had stated, “The input maybe kindly enquired into on priority and a feedback given to us.”

What required inclusion in assessing this information should have been the following: (1) whether the information was reliable or not, and the reasons for such a conclusion; and (2) a proposal to plan immediate security safeguards if the threat was likely to manifest. Instead of proceeding on these lines, what had been suggested was the conduct of “inquiries”. There was no sense of urgency shown here. It may therefore not be wrong to assume that priorities appeared to have been mixed up in the note of the SIS. Therefore, since the two papers of (CNI and the SIS) did not provide ‘assessments’, they were NOT INTELLIGENCE reports, but mere reports embodying untested information.

Besides, the SIS, if it believed a piece of information to be credible, had to submit serial or special Intelligence reports to the president, secretary of defence, and the IGP . This step had also not been taken. The process convincing those who mattered had therefore been incomplete. This is because on the face of the memorandum of April 9, 2019, there is no indication that the writers had decided to energize, galvanize and push the secretary of defence and the IGP to act without delay. In a nutshell, the reports of April 9, 2021 appeared vague and hazy. They were not ‘wake up’ calls.

Was it possible that the SIS may not have been sufficiently convinced of the credibility of the information received for whatever reason? It is difficult to understand why they had deviated from the standards that had been observed by the national intelligence agency for countless years. For many years, heads and senior officers of the premier Intelligence service, Cyril Herath, Ana Seneviratne, , Edward Gunawardene, A T Fonseka, Zernie Wijesuriya, B A Jeyanathan , Felix Alles, Kingsley Wickramasuriya, Pat Swaris, SBW de Silva, M A Jayatillake, Sathkunarajah, Deva Corea, Indradasa, Wakista, Gajanayake, Punya de Silva etc, had only furnished intelligence reports to the authorities, not untested pieces of information. They had been accomplished practitioners of this unbroken tradition of assessing information.

It is also surprising that the SIS omitted to crosscheck the information received with it’s Indian counterparts, or to take into consideration the ample records of the activities of the NTJ ( Mawanella, Kattankudi, Vanathavillu), stored in its registry. The adoption of such steps may have convinced officers that the information was of a serious and credible nature.

PUBLIC OUTCRY AGAINST THE FORMER PRESIDENT

President Sirisena has been at the center of a storm over perceived omissions on his part. In fairness to him, the question that requires an answer is whether the director of SIS, despite speaking on a monotonously regular basis to the president (I believe this proximate connection did exist), informed him that the information was of a reliable nature, even if we assume that he had made reference to the information perfunctorily. In my view, director of SIS may not have done so, for he had not, either in writing or orally, proceeded to convince even secretary of defence, Chief of National Intelligence and the IGP of the credibility of information received. Therefore, would he have briefed the president differently? The fact that an intelligence report had not been despatched to the president as had been the usual practice, may further support this point of view.

OMISSIONS OF OFFICIALDOM

Secretary of Defence, the IGP and his deputies who had received the flawed information reports should have examined the material by initiating discussions in their enclaves. These officials were assigned national security and defence responsibilities, and could not have chosen to ignore even the untested information which spoke of planned terror attacks. If secretary of Defence and IGP had held discussions with the participation of SIS officers, convincing material about the background of the NTJ may have come to light, leading to an awareness of dangers, and the need to prepare security plans. The inertia of Secretary of Defence, IGP, and his deputies to desist from engaging in conferences to test the veracity of the untested information is baffling. On the other hand, had the SIS made a proper intelligence report as should have been the case, it was possible that the officials concerned may have swung into action without being complacent.

IDENTIFYING ROOTS AND RAMIFICATIONS OF NATIONAL THOWHEED JAMAT (NTJ)

The Presidential Commission was required to explore the roots and ramifications of the NTJ. This is a vast tract. In effect, the process requires a study of many fields: the causes or grievances which sustained the NTJ, their local and foreign links and patrons, financiers; procurement and storage of arms, arms training and indoctrination, safe houses, methods of communication, district operational cells etc. Most information in such spheres in respect of clandestine, highly sophisticated terror groups emerge from intelligence received from secret sources, not from those who can provide overt, peripheral information. Even material which accrue from open police investigations are inadequate to build up a convincing dossier.

I therefore believe that about 60-70 % of intelligence about the roots and ramifications of a terror group can be procured from covert agents and informers, rather than from overt sources. Unfortunately the SIS has always shown great reluctance to permit access to such classified intelligence stored in their Registry. A study of roots and ramifications in former days was done by the national intelligence agency itself where periodic comprehensive reports were prepared and furnished for the National Security Council to take suitable remedial measures to thwart threats. I think this discipline was in vogue only up to the late 1980s. The point that such studies are usually handled by those with expertise in subjects of national security, intelligence, terror and subversion needs emphasis for findings and conclusions have invariably to be based more on intelligence (60-70%), than on oral evidence. Evidence is a scarce commodity with terror groups.

(The writer is a retired Senior DIG Police who had held important intelligence positions is the course of a long career. He testified before the Presidential Commission probing the Easter attacks.)