The Wagner mutiny, a fortnight later

By Uditha Devapriya

History unfolded in Russia in February last year when Vladimir Putin launched his military offensive in Ukraine. History unfolded a second time two weeks ago when one of Russia’s most powerful private militias, which contributed significantly to that offensive, turned the tables on their benefactor. The Wagner mutiny has shaken the foundations of Russia’s and Putin’s military-industrial complex, though not to the extent of fermenting a civil war – at least, not yet. The threat of an insurrection continues to loom, and although Putin seems to have saved face, the insurrectionary moment has not passed. Russia is a large country, and history here tends to occur more than once, not always as farce.

Putin’s response to the mutiny, as it unfolded, is indicative of how he views himself in the larger Russian body politic. In the leadup to the Russia-Ukraine War he took potshots at Lenin, justifying Stalin’s stance on the Ukraine Question. Putin’s sympathies are not with the Left, although the Left in much of the Global South, including Sri Lanka, has sided with his country against the NATO-backed Ukrainian government. Putin himself does not seem to sympathise with the Left: in his speech condemning the mutiny, he likened the latter to the Bolshevik Revolution, which in his view “was such a blow.” A blow to what, though? A blow to Russia’s potential victory in World War I – a victory that was “stolen.”

From the narrow perspective of self-preservation – the fundamental criterion of power in international relations – the Wager mutiny was a massive blow to Putin. It was a massive blow, for two main reasons. It revealed the flaws in Putin’s military superstructure, and it ruffled feathers in the Global South, whose efforts at delinking from the hegemony of the dollar and achieving solidarity amongst themselves are seen as contingent on the role Russia and China plays in sustaining a multipolar world order. As Russia’s strategic partner, China is bound to take note of these developments. It is bound to be wary of them, even if relations between the two do not take a hit. Moreover, as Rathindra Kuruwita has argued, the Wagner mutiny will rile countries “looking for a stable long-term ally in Russia.”

What went wrong? Napoleon Bonaparte was probably not the greatest military strategist out there, and it would be anachronistic to liken him to Putin. But he is credited with two important military axioms. The first is “Every French soldier carries a marshal’s baton in his knapsack”, the second “An army marches on its stomach.” In pushing the Wagner Group beyond its limits, Putin overlooked the first axiom and violated the second.

 Essentially, he ignored, or chose to ignore, the time-tested fact – time-tested because it has happened so often across countries and regions – that dissatisfied military commanders tend to rebel against their patrons. The breaking point comes, at some point. In Russia the signs were there long before last Saturday’s putsch: tellingly, Yevgeny Prigozhin’s haranguing against Defence Minster Sergei Shoigu and General Valery Gerasimov.

Prigozhin’s contribution to the Ukraine War cannot be overrated, which is perhaps why the Western press, and the US government, have not exactly embraced his actions with open arms. Since its establishment in 2014, the Wagner Group has been at the frontlines in every major Russian offensive or counteroffensive. It has fought with the Libyan Army, the Free Syrian Army, and the Ukrainian military. The Group played a major role in Russia’s Ukraine campaign when it captured the eastern city of Bakhmut in May this year.

But such victories came at an exorbitant cost, and they have contributed to a dampening of the euphoria with which Russia’s elites welcomed Putin’s Ukraine offensive. To paraphrase Elliot Ackerman of The Atlantic, in a single stroke Russia has been deprived of its most effective military outfit, something “the Ukrainian military and its NATO allies have failed to achieve in 18 months of war.” This is a massive, massive setback, whichever way you look at it.

Most damagingly, it has dented the image of Russia that Putin courted throughout the Global South for over a year. This is not to say the Global South will turn away from Moscow. Countries like India will continue dealing with Russia, because to them, inasmuch as the Russia-Ukraine War is Ukraine’s and, by proxy, the West’s problem, the Wagner mutiny is Russia’s and Putin’s problem.

Jaishankar may argue, validly, that Europe’s problems are not the world’s problems, but applying the same logic to the mutiny, the Global South stands to gain nothing from choosing sides in Russia’s internal squabbles. A divided Russia, however, is good news for the West. It is damaging for the Far Right, because the Far Right, in countries like the US, views Putin positively and frames Beijing as the bigger evil.

But it will benefit the NATO allied Left, including the British Labour Party, and Third Way Centrists, including the US Democrats, who are pushing down hard on Putin’s efforts.

It will reinforce Western narratives of authoritarianism’s eventual demise, and will push the West, led by the US, to promote its image in the Global South. Much of the Global South is undergoing a massive debt crisis, a debt crisis exacerbated, but not caused, by the Russia-Ukraine War. There will not be any end of history narratives of the sort that greeted the end of the Soviet Union in 1991, but there will be the typical discourses pinning liberal values as the only values that matter.

For that, the Russian State has no one else to blame but its own failures. This is, to be sure, a harsh judgement, but one echoed by Dayan Jayatilleka as well. In a recent, perceptive piece to Russia in Global Affairs, Jayatilleka notes that “the grievances that led to this mutiny have to be addressed.” A failure to do so will only lead to a repetition of last Saturday’s events. Neither Russia nor Putin can or will afford such a contingency. From a survivalist perspective, he will have to do all he can to pre-empt that.

The writer is an international relations analyst, researcher, and columnist who can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com.