Sinhala Only, satyagraha and trouble in the Port of Colombo

(Excerpted from the Memoirs of a Cabinet Secretary by BP Peiris)

Taking advantage of the Sinhala Only Act, Minister Ilangaratne sent me the first Cabinet Paper in Sinhala, in which language I was not proficient. I therefore asked the Prime Minister for his authority to return the Paper to the Minister with a request that it be sent in English. All that the Prime Minister said was “Don’t be frightened, my dear fellow, don’t be frightened”. I issued the paper in Sinhala but, for my own guidance, had a translation prepared in English which the Prime Minister used at the meeting.

After that he used my translation every time. The Prime Minister’s inability to read Sinhala came out publicly in court and caused a slight titter when he was being cross-examined by Pritt, Q. C. in a Trial-at-Bar. In spite of the Sinhala Only Act, Cabinet discussions have always been in English. I therefore started issuing all Cabinet Papers in Sinhala and English, and no one ever looked at the Sinhala copy.

Currency notes were affected by the changeover. The note-printers inquired from the Central Bank whether any changes were desired in the language and portrait on the notes. The portrait referred to was that of the Queen who was Queen of Ceylon. The Cabinet decided that prominent lettering on the face of the note should be changed from English to Sinhala and on the back of the note from English to Tamil, the value of the note to be shown in smaller characters in English and Tamil on the face, and in English and Sinhala on the back. The legend on the face of the note was to be changed from English to Sinhala and the portrait of Her Majesty the Queen was to be replaced by the Armorial Ensign of Ceylon, a design of which had been submitted by the printers. The Ensign itself was replaced later by a portrait of S.W.R.D. The signature on the notes were to be changed from English to Sinhala. The signatures are those of the Minister of Finance and the Governor of the Central Bank.

With the switch-over to Sinhala, S. J. V. Chelvanayakam, the Leader of the Federal Party, a Queen’s Counsel and a man of peace, informed the Prime Minister that it was proposed to have a peaceful demonstration by performing satyagraha outside the House of Representatives on June 5, 1956. He asked for co-operation and for instructions to be issued to the officials concerned to see that the satyagrahis were protected and not disturbed. The Prime Minister ordered the Police to seal off the approaches to the House in order to prevent a crowd gathering either in the precincts of the House of just outside it.

The policy of appeasement had begun. S.W.R.D. showed his genuine love for the people the day the mob invaded the Chamber of the House and the Speaker’s dais, when he told the Police Officer who was trying to stop the onrush, “No. Let the people come!”

Col. Kotelawala’s reaction to similar cases was different. When he was Prime Minister, a telegram addressed to him was delivered at my house one day at about midnight. It said that some person was fasting and asked for the urgent intervention of the Prime Minister. As I could not disturb the Prime Minister at that time over such a trifling matter, I saw him in his office the next morning. When I read the telegram out to him, he roared at me “What the bloody hell have I got to do with a b….’s fast!”

And now, following on the Sinhala Only Act and Chelvanayakam’s satyagraha, the Sinhalese got ideas into their heads and assumed that this country had no room for the Tamils. They began to loot Tamil boutiques and to burn the houses of respectable Tamil gentlemen. The Inspector-General of Police reported to the Cabinet cases of looting, arson, hooliganism and stone-throwing. Offenders did not appear to be organized and there were, therefore, no ring leaders. The Police had to fire twice.

The Prime Minister, once firm, stated that this type of hooliganism must stop, and he directed ,the Police to take all effective steps to that end, including shooting as a very last resort. He was going to broadcast a message to the nation. He asked Ministers, leading bikhus and citizens to visit the troubled areas and persuade the people to disperse and be peaceful. This, at a time of civil commotion. He thought the question of declaring an emergency and imposing a curfew should be deferred. The Army was ordered to have five hundred men ready to assist the Police.

The Tamils were afraid to live in their houses. Those whose houses were still intact and undamaged, decided to close the houses and send their families to the North, where they would be safe. My stenographer, Nallaratnam, put his wife and two children of tender years in charge of the Mount Lavinia Police station. There were about eight hundred others there, and the lavatory arrangements were most inadequate for so large an unexpected number of persons.

When I heard about his, I told Nallaratnam that he should not have put his family to this inconvenience and herd them like cattle. A curfew had now been imposed and there was an armed guard with a fixed bayonet outside my gate. I asked him to bring his wife and children to my house. It was safe and I would look after them. He thanked me, but politely refused, saying that he did not want to see my house stoned for parking Tamils. I did, however, park a Tamil gentleman, about eighty years of age, throughout the emergency.

It was about this time that word was brought during a Cabinet sitting that several hundred Buddhist priests had squatted on the road opposite the Prime Minister’s house in Rosmead Place, that the entire road had been blocked by the squatters and that no traffic could pass. The priests demanded the immediate presence of the Prime Minister. What should the Prime Minister have done? Sir John, with his military training, would have ordered the Police to clear the road and use reasonable force if necessary. S.W.R.D., with his appeasement policy, adjourned the Cabinet meeting and went to speak to the priests to find out what their grievances were.

Having found out their grievances, he promised them redress, but the priests would have none of it. They demanded that the Prime Minister put his promise into writing, and the Prime Minister complied. On the Prime Minister giving the priests the writing they required, they departed. They now knew the power which they possessed when they had insulted the Prime Minister of the country and brought him to his knees. They had helped him in his election and they were now having their own back. What a tragedy! What a sorry pass we had come to!

S.W.R.D. had decided to appoint a Commission to consider the setting up of a Buddha Sasana Council to promote the welfare of the Buddha Sasana, the establishment of ecclesiastical courts to have exclusive jurisdiction in matters relating to the Sangha, the better management of temporalities, the scheme of education necessary for the Sangha, the advancement of pirivena education, the measures to be taken to prevent unordained persons from assuming the habit of members of the Sangha, and the registration of Buddhist places of worship. The Commission duly reported but, in view of the controversy it raised among the clergy, the recommendations have not yet been implemented.

In November 1956, with the increasing cost of living, there was trouble in the Port of Colombo. There was a threatened strike and the work of the Port was declared to be an industry essential to the life of the community. In view of the possibility, if there was a strike, of strikers resorting to the use of thugs to prevent those who were willing to work from working, the Inspector-General of Police was directed to take all steps to round up and take into protective custody all Island re-convicted criminals and any other suspicious characters from the area in the vicinity of the Khan Clock Tower. He was also directed to give the maximum protection to those who reported for duty in the Port. The armed forces were again ordered to assist the police, if necessary.

The Cabinet viewed with grave concern, the steadily deteriorating position in the Port and the consequent damage to the economy of the country. On account of the inordinate delays in the handling of cargo, shipping companies were showing a reluctance to book freight to and from Colombo. This was resulting, on the one hand, in a threat to our food supplies and supplies of other essential commodities, and on the other, in a serious disruption of the regular export of the country’s produce.

The situation was largely attributable to the unsettled labour conditions in the Port and the frequent stoppages, and threats of stoppage of work. These unsettled conditions were due to the lines the Prime Minister had previously taken, which encouraged workers to the view that they had only to ask to be given. The urgency of the situation had increased by the deteriorating international situation and the scarcity of shipping facilities.

In these circumstances, the Government decided to take steps to ensure continued efficiency in the handling of cargoes. They appointed a Commission of Inquiry with a view to ameliorating the conditions then prevailing.