Sinhala Buddhist nationalism – trump card or junk bond of national bourgeoisie

by Satyajith Andradi

The presidential election of November 2019 was a point of inflection in the electoral history of Sri Lanka. It restored political power to the economically and socially powerful national bourgeoisie. The importance of that political event prompted me to write two pieces for these columns at the time. In the first article, titled ‘Presidential election 2019 and the rise of the national bourgeoisie’ written few days before the election, I described the presidential race as a contest between the comprador bourgeoisie – the capitalist class subservient to the interest of western capital, represented by the UNP-led alliance, and the national bourgeoisie -– the indigenous capitalist class, represented by an alliance led by the off-shoot of the SLFP, and concluded that the odds are in the latter’s favour. In the second piece, titled ‘ Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism and the marginalisation of minorities’ written shortly after the election, it was explained how the national bourgeoisie came to adopt Sinhala Buddhist nationalism as its ideology.

Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism and

the national bourgeoisie

The history of post-Independence electoral politics of Sri Lanka (especially since the formation of the SLFP in the early 1950s, and the consequent sidelining of the left parties) has been, essentially, the history of the power struggle between the comprador bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie – a sort of ding-dong battle between the two capitalist factions. As already mentioned, the interests of the comprador capitalists class has been closely aligned with the interests of western capital. This class favours open economy, private sector power, and economic liberalism. It draws considerable support from the Anglicised urban petty bourgeoisie and the significant ethnic and religious minorities of the country such as Tamils, Hindus, Muslims and Catholics.

The national bourgeoisie favours the protection and development of local industries, import substitution, and the protection of the public sector (aka. state sector, government sector). It finds its vote base amongst the Sinhala Buddhist peasantry, the non-Anglicised Sinhala Buddhist petty bourgeoisie, public sector employees, and a sizeable segment of the working class. By and large, the support of the working class has been harnessed through its alliance with left parties, such as the LSSP and the CPSL, which have been lured by the national bourgeoisie’s frequent anti-western and anti–privatisation rhetoric.

Two momentous post–election years

Two years have passed since Sri Lanka’s most recent presidential election. Generally, such a duration is too short to warrant a thoroughgoing review. However, the past two years have been extraordinary, both locally and globally. This is primarily due to the COVID -19 pandemic, which has affected almost all aspects of human life worldwide. The health crisis, which has already claimed more than 14,000 lives in Sri Lanka, has led to unprecedented economic and social turmoil in Sri Lanka and abroad.

Two years ago, at the time of the presidential election, Sri Lanka economy was anything but a healthy one. It was tormented by, to use the popular medical jargon, ‘ serious underlying health conditions’ such as formidable foreign debt, below par economic growth, and sizeable fiscal and current account deficits. The COVID– 19 pandemic, which hit Sri Lanka in early 2020 devastated the already ailing economy. As everyone knows, it brought about several prolonged lockdowns and travel restrictions, which disrupted business activities. This resulted in negative economic growth in 2020, ballooning fiscal deficits, drastically widening current account deficits, which in turn led to an alarming depletion of foreign reserves, a foreign debt crisis, a foreign exchange crisis, and the downgrading of Sri Lanka’s sovereign rating by international rating agencies. The economic devastation resulting from COVID – 19 precipitated a whole host of grave social problems such as loss of livelihoods, widespread poverty, destitutions, scarcity and unaffordability of food and other basic items.

Meanwhile, the new government’s move to rapidly shift to organic farming messed up the country’s agriculture, which was the sole major economic sector that was not negatively impacted by the pandemic. All these have resulted in considerable social unrest. They have antagonised wide sections of the new government’s vote base, such as peasant farmers and public sector employees, including teachers and nurses, and brought them to the streets. Meanwhile, the government’s attempt to sell state assets to foreign companies, in spite of its anti- western and anti– privatisation rhetoric, is meeting resistance. At the time of writing this piece, the trade unions of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation, the Ceylon Electricity Board and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority are threatening joint strike action against the sale of state assets to foreign companies. These developments do not auger well for the new government. However, it could claim credit for a few achievements. Notable amongst them is its successful vaccination programme: Around 73% of the entire population has been fully vaccinated up to date. Another plus point is the absence of terrorist activities during the past two years.

Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism – trump card or junk bond of the national bourgeoisie

The national bourgeoisie gained political power two years ago with the huge support of the Sinhala Buddhist voters. No doubt, Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism played a pivotal role in bringing it to power. The two momentous years since the election have drastically changed the socio – economic situation to the worse.

Adverse social developments such as widespread poverty, destitution, and the acute shortage and the unaffordability of basic food and other essential items, could compel the electorate to shift its priorities from Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism to bare economic survival. However, it should be noted that there are three more years for the next presidential election. Although this is not an awful lot of time, it cannot be ruled out that, with some real luck, smart thinking and hard work, the economy could be turned around during these three years. If such a recovery is coupled with substantial ‘Poor Relief’ and an environment free of terror attacks, the national bourgeoisie would be able to salvage its vote base. In such situation, Sinhala Buddhist nationalism is bound to once again serve as the trump card. However, if the socio-economic situation deteriorates further, basic economic concerns such as cost of living and the availability of food and other essential items are bound to take precedence over Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism.

In such event, most of the electorate would perceive Sinhala Buddhist nationalism as a junk bond and shy away from it, seriously jeopardising the national bourgeoisie’s prospects of retaining political power.