Proposed Anti-Terrorism Bill: Real tiger, paper tiger or mixed bag

By Nuwan Peiris

The writer is an Attorney, Chartered Shipbroker (UK) and UN-ITLOS Nippon Fellow 2012/2013. He holds M.Sc. Logistics (BCU-UK), LL.M (International Maritime Law) (IMO-IMLI), LL. M (International Trade Law) (Wales), LL.B (O.U.S.L).

“No generalization is wholly true – not even this one.” – Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes

The recent Anti-Terrorism Bill (ATA) has garnered more attention than one could ever imagine for a law. Emotional and sweeping generalizations are made by all and sundry on the proposed ATA. Even the recently enacted 21st Amendment did not receive so much attention from the public. Why is it that a law like the proposed ATA receives so much attention? There seems to be a legitimate fear that the proposed ATA may be no different to the existing law, namely PTA (Prevention of Terrorism Act), if not worse.

But what is the reality? Who drafted this proposed ATA? From the skilled draftsmanship associated with the proposed ATA, the draft law requires an in-depth analysis for a proper understanding unlike some of the recently introduced laws by the government.

Weaker than UK Law – Why?

In essence, the proposed ATA seems to be a strategically diluted version of the UK’s Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 – incorporating the amendments that were introduced by the UK after the London bombing. Worse still, proposed ATA is inconsequential in its effect when it comes to combating global terrorism as far as some of the fundamental provisions are concerned; in other words, a feeble draft law compared to the Patriot Act of the USA which became law after the 9/11 attacks. However, the proposed ATA may be an abusive weapon as far its enforcement orders are concerned, such as the Miscellaneous Orders contained in Part X. In short, the proposed ATA is a mixed bag. For example, most of the protestors’ dissent to the proposed law gyrates on these abusive enforcement orders.

How does a draft law like this instant one finds its way, from nowhere, to the official gazette without much public discussion? The purpose of this very brief write-up is to urge the Government in power and the opposition parties to prevent the proposed ATA being tabled in the Parliament, instead to appoint a Select Committee in the Parliament comprising of varied interests so that the matter can be reconsidered and better reforms of the ATA can be effected with consensus.

And the important point to consider by this proposed Select Committee in the Parliament is to introduce an ATA to tackle global terrorism effectively, and promulgate a law that is in line with the Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK (as amended), and better still the Patriot Act of USA – and be mindful not to introduce a version that is weaker than the UK law. Hence, the President, the Prime Minister, and the Justice Minister should be advised to set-up a Select Committee in the Parliament, so that the proposed ATA can be changed to become an acceptable legal instrument in combating global terrorism, and avoid becoming a law which is far weaker than the UK law on terrorism.

If the proposed ATA becomes law, this law may not have the same effectiveness in combating global terrorism especially given the weak substantive provisions in clauses 2 and 3, coupled with arbitrary procedural provisions that may lead to abuse in implementation. Such a proposed ATA will serve neither the purpose of combating global terrorism nor ensuring procedural fairness to the ones who are caught up as suspects. A middle of nowhere legislation, although drafted well disguised, may not serve Sri Lanka well, noting that further legislation similar to Bio-Security Act 2015 from Australia is needed to combat biological and chemical attacks. What is needed is to have extensive deliberations in a fresh Parliamentary Select Committee, where all of us can share and contribute with our experience to the formulation of a far-sighted ATA.

Why is ATA weaker than UK and USA laws?

There are two fundamental provisions in the proposed ATA – clauses 2 and 3. Clause 2 deals with jurisdiction and clause 3 deals with the offence of terrorism.This is the typical structure of an ATA law in many countries, and drafts men followed the universal structure – and we see nothing wrong in this. Here, Clause 2 becomes the international jurisdiction base for the implementation of the proposed ATA.

Clause 3 contains the offence of terrorism that becomes the basis on which other offences and provisions are built upon. Clause 3 is the mother provision, and the rest of the offences are the offspring of Clause 3 – which is typical of any ATA in the world including the UK.

Clause 2 – the clause on jurisdiction – becomes the basis for enforcement powers mentioned in the Part X of proposed ATA. Whilst the enforcement powers in the Miscellaneous Part – that comprises of Proscription Orders, Prohibition Orders, Restriction Orders etc., which is less judicially accountable – are wide and arbitrary when applied within Sri Lanka; on the contrary, its overall reach and enforcement of such Orders in the context of global terrorism is ‘fragile’ given the limitations in Clause 2.

Both Clauses 2 and 3 are the foundational structure of the proposed ATA, and the enforcement provisions contained in the rest of the ATA, including Part X forms the superstructure. Let us examine each of these aspects.

Clause 2 – Jurisdiction 

There is extra-territorial application of the proposed ATA. This is a salient feature, and this is far better drafted than the ill-fated, and now demised, Counter-Terrorism Bill that was presented in 2018.

An extract of Clause 2 is as follows;

“2. (1) The provisions of this Act shall apply to any person who commits an offence under this Act, whether within or outside the territorial limits of Sri Lanka, including- …”

First limb of Clause 2(1) ends with the word ‘including’ – but given the subsequent sub-clauses it is unclear whether such sub-clauses are in fact have limiting effects on the wide scope of the first operative limb – namely, “[the] provisions of this Act shall apply to any person who commits an offence under this Act, whether within or outside the territorial limits of Sri Lanka.” It is preferable that the word, ‘including’ is replaced by the words ‘including, but not limited to -’.

Overall, it is unclear whether Sri Lanka has jurisdiction over a purely international crime of terrorism committed in violation of clause 3 of the proposed ATA. Say, if an African terrorist group (which is not proscribed as per clause 82 of the ATA) launches a pirate attack on a foreign flagged vessel in the Indian high seas, and one of the members of said terror group ends up on the shores of Sri Lanka, it is unclear whether such terrorist can be investigated and prosecuted in Sri Lanka. The entire commission of the act is in the high seas, and the said terror group is unknown to Sri Lanka, yet ends up in Sri Lanka. In this example, the ambit of the applicability of clause 2 remains questionable to exercise jurisdiction by Sri Lanka.

Or else, if assistance is sought from our State, and the government dispatches a naval convoy to help the distressed vessel, and having offered assistance in the high seas, and the crew and the vessel is brought to Sri Lanka for medical treatment, can the Sri Lankan authority initiate investigations on this matter that occurred exclusively in the High seas? The legal regime of the high seas is contained in Part VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982, and the high seas are beyond the jurisdiction of any national jurisdiction of any State. Although, clause 2(c) seems to be broad enough to cover such foreign citizens by the use of words ‘any person’, clause 2(d) seems to limit the applicability of clause 2(c). Whether this is specifically brought to the attention of the government and MPs are uncertain. Also noteworthy is the uncertainty pervading the inclusive nature of clause 2(1) by the use of the words ‘including’ at the early stages, as noted by me earlier. All this, compounds the uncertainty to the jurisdictional ambit of the applicability of the proposed ATA. Therefore, there is a need to revisit the jurisdictional ambit of clause 2.

Similarly, there are many drawbacks in clause 2, and the application of the said jurisdictional clause must be considered in the light of the public international law and its bases on international jurisdiction, and how much of such international State rights that should be contained in a proposed ATA in line with similar legislation like Patriot Act of the USA or Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK. Curtailing such international rights that legitimately belong to Sri Lanka without a rational policy basis is not acceptable. Hence the proposed ATA should be reconsidered for the want of workable jurisdiction. The writer is fully aware of the criticisms on the counter terrorism laws of the UK and USA. Whether Sri Lanka wishes to retract from UK’s/USA’s positions need to be objectively decided by the policy makers with wider consultation.

Another example of a defect in clause 2 is that sub-clause (d) says, that a person who had been a citizen of Sri Lanka commits the offence of terrorism within the territory of the Republic of Sri Lanka, say today, but found out later; and he subsequently shifts his habitual residence from Sri Lanka; for the provisions of the proposed ATA to be applied the concurrence of the foreign State of which he is a citizen is required. The problem continues further. Also, what if that foreign citizen later visits Sri Lanka, or he is intercepted by a Sri Lankan naval operation in the high seas and brought to the shores of Sri Lanka; does Sri Lanka have the jurisdiction to prosecute this person – although such foreign citizen now does not have any habitual residence in Sri Lanka? It is questionable whether clause 2 covers such a situation. That means, clause 2(c) seems to be broad enough to cover such foreign citizens by the use of the words ‘any person’, but clause 2(d) seems to limit the applicability of clause 2(c).

There are so many defects in clause 2. But the scope and the space of this write-up does not allow me to expand. There is provision for extra-territorial jurisdiction in the UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 for terrorist financing and terrorist bombing offences in line with the UN Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist bombings and the UN Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism. The appeal to the government is to reconsider the proposed ATA.

Clause 3 – The Offence of Terrorism

The offence of terrorism under clause 3 forms the basis for a number of criminal offenses; and triggers the application of many provisions including the encouragement of terrorism, and wide-ranging powers, like the designation and proscription of terrorist organizations; and other enforcement powers and orders.

Similarly, the Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK, includes acts of terrorism committed both in and outside of the UK, as the use or threat of one or more of the actions listed in the section, and under the Act, terrorism is currently defined as “the use or threat [of action] designed to “influence” the government or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and the use or threat is made for the purposes of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause. (Vide, Section 1(1) of the Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK.)

Lord Carlile’s report on “The Definition of Terrorism,” March 2007, reviewed the scope of the definition of the Anti terrorism Act of the UK and stated that the UK definition is “consistent with international comparators and treaties, and is useful and broadly fit for purpose”. In his report, Lord Carlile recommended amending the language so that only actions or the threat of action designed “to intimidate” the government, instead of the much broader word “influence”, fall within the definition.

The present the section 1(1) of the UK reads as follows;

In this Act “terrorism” means the use or threat of action where—

(a)the action falls within subsection (2),

(b)the use or threat is designed to influence the government or an international governmental organisation or to intimidate the public or a section of the public, and

(c)the use or threat is made for the purpose of advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause.

The words such as “influence” can be considered much wider than the word “wrongfully” that is mentioned in clause 3(1) of our proposed ATA.

Further, the UK Act in section 4(1) contains broad definitions. For e.g. the reference to any person or to property is a reference to any person, or to property, wherever situated, and a reference to the public includes a reference to the public of any country, and “the government” means the government of the United Kingdom, of a Part of the United Kingdom or of a country other than the United Kingdom. However such effective and broad definitions do not exist in our proposed ATA.

Further, Section 38B(1) and (2) of the Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK says that it is an offence if one does not inform the police if he believes that someone he knows is in preparation of acts of terrorism. The maximum sentence in respect of Section 38B of the Act is for a term not exceeding five years’ imprisonment, although it is a defence to prove that he had a reasonable excuse for not making the disclosure.

It is also observed that the intention is expressly required as the mental element of the crime in clause 3, whereas the word ‘knowledge’ would be preferable given the complexity involved in the crime. However, section 1 of the UK Anti-terrorism Act seems to require no overburden of such intention or knowledge to the extent of proposed ATA.

The frequently cited leading case on strict liability and the presumption of ‘mens rea’ is Sweet v Parsley [1970] AC 132. But the recent case supreme court judgment of PWR (AP) (Appellant) v Director of Public Prosecutions (Respondent) [2022] UKSC 2 held that such presumption is rebutted for the offence contained in section 13. All this shows how broadly the UK s Anti-Terrorism Act is applied, which is a clear lesson for us.

It is in this context that our proposed ATA should be reviewed as to its narrowness in combating global terrorism, and abusive in enforcing miscellaneous orders on the contrary.

The General Fears about Proposed ATA

There is an overwhelming agitation that the proposed ATA will turn out to be draconian law – just as bad as the existing PTA, if not worse. Fears have been galvanised to such an extent that many opposition parties and activists have decided to challenge the proposed ATA in the Supreme Court.

A common question they ask is whether any trade union activists or media activists that protest in public or air their voice against the government be dealt with under the proposed ATA. Such possibilities are rare given the highly structured nature of the mother clause 3 and her associated offspring provisions. The threshold tests that are needed to graduate an act to one of terrorism that gets caught in clause 3 or its associated provisions is placed at a high level, and it is very unlikely that mere protests would classify as an act of terrorism. Many, if not all the offences are directly connected to clause 3, as noted above. It is very unlikely that a final conviction from a court of law will victimize a group of mere protesters or a group of media activists engaged in criticising the government. If such be the case, the UK’s Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 would have led to far greater concerns, since, as I indicated above, the proposed ATA law in Sri Lanka is much narrower than that of the UK’s 2000 Act.

However, it needs to be observed that enforcement/miscellaneous powers that are widely couched in Part X can nevertheless be abused in the short term, and innocent people may be apprehended as suspects. Therefore a group of protesters or media activists can be harassed in the short run given the weaknesses in the enforcement procedures. Hence, it is the enforcement powers and procedures that need a revamp for the want of a greater judicial scrutiny.

One more point on Part X – miscellaneous powers in the proposed ATA. Take a look at the Anti-Terrorism Act 2000 of the UK. There is far greater judicial accountability in the UK regime, for eg., detailed de-proscription procedures in the UK law compared to the proposed ATA etc. global terror networks are complex and dangerous.

Take this example. Assume that a terror group takes an LNG carrier and her crew as hostage in the outer harbour of Colombo Port, where the sabotaging of this carrier would cause enormous destruction similar to the explosion of a nuclear bomb. The hostage situation goes on for 10 days in outer harbor. Fortunately, in the early hours of the hostage crisis Sri Lanka arrests a suspect in the Port connected to the hostage crisis. It is not advisable to bring in a human rights oversight body to question the well being of the suspect taken to custody in the first few days, since the hostage crisis is ongoing and the counter-terrorism operations are still going on. And the arrested suspect may be needed for hostage negotiation and other counter-terrorism measures. It is best advised that the proposed ATA is revisited given the serious lacuna it has with regard to the weaknesses even on the procedural provisions in addressing organized global terror networks.

The writer is aware of the statements so far issued by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) and Center for Policy Alternatives (CPA). It is noted that all these observations are primarily, if not exclusively, centred on the required procedural due process in the enforcement powers, rather than on the restrictive nature of clauses such as 2 and 3. The concerns such as lack of a proper definition of terrorism, ‘glorification’ being made an offence after the London bombing, and other substantive due process concerns etc., nevertheless exist in the UK/USA Laws, and there is no necessity for Sri Lanka to deviate from these advanced foreign legal regimes without broader expert consultation, and if a deviation from the UK/USA laws are warranted such policy must be carefully considered.

Finally – A call for a fresh Parliamentary Select Committee, a call to calm down for the public and a plea for the government to delay the proposed law:

The overabundance of criticisms from the trade unions, professional bodies, religious bodies and the NGOs need to be tempered with wiser counsel in the interest of the country. The government should also be mindful to restrain itself from introducing sweeping powers for procedural enforcement which have less judicial scrutiny. This write-up once again reiterates its clarion call to halt this legislation being pushed so hurriedly through the legislative deliberation process. We call upon all the professional/religious bodies, trade unions, NGOs and the political parties to request the powers that be to have a Parliamentary Select Committee so that an objectively drafted ATA can be finalised to one which the government and the citizens in this country want and can agree.

(The writer is an Attorney, Chartered Shipbroker (UK) and UN-ITLOS Nippon Fellow 2012/2013. He holds M.Sc. Logistics (BCU-UK), LL.M (International Maritime Law) (IMO-IMLI), LL. M (International Trade Law) (Wales), LL.B (O.U.S.L).