‘Place of refuge’ – the international debate

By Capt. Ranjith Weerasinghe

Ships are built to conform to highest safety standards under the guidelines of the International Maritime Organisations (IMO). The stringent regulatory regime is further reinforced by the latest technology in modern day ships in ship design, building, operations, maintenance, management and competency of crew. However, there will always be ships in distress, regardless of what stringent regulatory regimes are followed as has been the case ever since man took to water transportation even before the invention of the wheel. When a ship is in distress, absolutely helpless at sea, help is inevitably sought by the ship’s captain. A distressed vessel struggles to get to the nearest coastal state for a place of refuge, and the denial of entry can lead to disaster. If a ship’s captain requested assistance in case of a peril at sea, and all the ports in the world decides not to take the ship to a place of refuge, what would the world expect the ships’ crew to do?

Historically and traditionally, ships in distress have been given whatever help by vessels in the vicinity and the coastal states authorities when they happen to be in coastal waters. Help includes providing a sheltered place to manage the problem, to prevent it from further deterioration, assist the crew, provide repair facility, transfer cargo, firefighting, salvage, towage, or assistance to save lives and property and protect the environment. But with notable oil tanker disasters resulting in unprecedented environment pollution incidents, by mid 70s, the coastal states became more concerned about granting place of refuge to vessels in distress in danger of fire, explosion, grounding, sinking, etc,. As a result, there is an ongoing international debate and a proposal for introducing an international law to grant ‘place of refuge”. This debate received international attention in early 2000 when several incidents took place due to the “refusal or denial of place of refuge”. One was Motor Tanker Erika in Dec 1999; it broke in two and sank off the coast of France and the other was MT Prestige in 2002, which broke up and sank off the coast of Spain; both vessels had been denied place of refuge and they caused extensive environmental damage. Similarly, a tanker named MT Castor with a structural failure could not find a place of refuge and was towed around in the Mediterranean Sea for more than a month. Finally, the Salvors removed the cargo oil at sea by ships to ship transfer and saved the vessel.

Against this backdrop, there was a compelling need for IMO to seek an agreement amongst member states to make a law with respect to “place of refuge”. Up to date it has not materialised due to concerns of coastal states. Short of such an agreement, the best the IMO could do was to adopt two resolutions in 2003, and they relate to vessels in distress or needing assistance:

1. A949 (23);

Intended for use when a vessel is in distress and cannot be left in the place without moving to safety

2. A950 (23)

Requiring all coastal states to establish a Maritime Assistance Service.

CONTAINER CARGO FIRES

Besides oil tanker fires, in recent times there have been fires on board container ships. The international insurance industry says one container ship fire occurs every two weeks somewhere in the world. In recent times, container ships MSC Flaminia, Maersk Honam, and Yantian Express suffered heavy damage and loss of life due to fire, and a long time was taken to find a place of refuge for it to discharge the cargo. A fire on board a container vessel is first a risk to the seafarers and the environment and secondly entails a very heavy economic cost–first, the cost of firefighting, salvage, towage and damage to the ship and cargo, and secondly, the cost of the ‘cargo related business interruptions’, which affects industries dependent on ‘just-in-time’ logistics.

Although there has been no instance of denial of ‘place of refuge’ in Sri Lanka, ships passing through its territorial waters are always in probable, unintended “place of refuge”. We also have had a few incidents of vessels in distress off our coast over the years. Whether we offer a place of refuge or not, as a coastal state, we have an obligation to be prepared to assist any distressed vessel. Such preparedness is critical and essential not only in view of the assistance sought by the vessels in trouble but also to avert probable environmental disasters that follow if the timely and effective assistance is not provided. In the said international context, Sri Lanka’s emergency preparedness for such contingencies is to be examined in response to MAS 950(23) Resolution.

The case of the fire-stricken X-Press Pearl at Colombo anchorage and the fire on board MT New Diamond tanker off the East coast of Sri Lanka provide lessons. In both cases it was so sad to see two marvelous ships being engulfed in a fire for days and the crew members suffering injury. Fortunately, New Diamond with 300,000MT crude oil did not lead to an environment disaster. But X-Press Pearl did.

In the case of X-Press Pearl, the following have been reported in the media:

Long before the vessel arrived in Sri Lanka its crew had noticed an acid leak from a container after leaving Jebel Ali in the UAE for Hamad in Qatar. In Hamad, the ship’s captain requested the discharge of the container, but his request was turned down.

Leaving the Hamad port, the Captain asked the ship owners to arrange for return to Jebel Ali to discharge the container, but the owners thought such action was not necessary as arrangements were expected at next port Hazira in Gujarat. The Port of Hazira refused to discharge the container at issue. Finally, the vessel arrived in Colombo as the next scheduled port and not as ‘a port of refuge’.

Some of the questions that Sri Lanka should ask in general are as follows;

In the case of vessel requesting a ‘a place of Refuge’, do we have an evaluation mechanism to make right conclusions? Do we have a well thought-out emergency response plan in place?

In the case of vessel needing assistance, are we ready to honour our international obligations to provide assistance as regards fires, imminent danger of grounding or sinking, preventing actual or probable environmental disasters, salvage and towage, calls for urgent medical emergencies.

While promoting Sri Lanka as a ‘maritime hub’, have we given serious thought to these aspects.

As for the X-PRESS PEARL incident, we should examine the following:

At the time the X-Press Pearl reported a presence of Nitric acid leaking container, and subsequently signs of fire inside container, did the authorities concerned carry out any assessment and evaluation with a view to taking necessary action?

Did the authorities have the information about the cargo on board the distressed ship—argo manifest and stowage plan – reference bay plan)?

Did the fire erupt in the container with 25MT of Nitric acid, which by nature is not flammable by itself but a highly corrosive oxidant in the Class 8 in the “International Maritime Dangerous Goods Code” (IMDG Code); if it leaks into other combustible materials, that can catch fire and become explosive.

If the Captain of the vessel had reported that the particular container identified from cargo manifest with nitric acid was leaking and there was a yellow fume, what should have been the evaluation? For example, in India, dangerous cargo cannot be handled without the approval of the DG Shipping as the highest state official of the sector, but in Sri Lanka it is left to the Ports Authority to take the relevant action

The vessel arrived at the Colombo Anchorage in early hours of 20 May 2021, and for two three days a yellow smoke had been emanating from the ship, according to media reports. Nitric acid must have leaked and mixed with something else, causing the fire.

If it is true that the issue was initially confined to that particular container with a manageable nitric acid leak, what prevented the SLPA from taking action to berth the nearly brand new vessel on priority basis and remove the container without waiting for her scheduled berthing slot? If we lack facilities to do so, we have to acquire them. If not, ships will face disasters for no fault of theirs as no ship crew or master inspects the stowage of cargo inside a container; it is left in the hands of shore authorities.

MT NEW DIAMOND AND THE LESSONS (NOT) LEARNT

As for MT New Diamond, when the incident took place about 20 miles off East Coast of Sri Lanka, with 300,000 MT of crude oil, we realised a few shortcomings, but do not seem to have learnt any lessons as can be seen from the following among others:

* Absence of a “responsible authority” prescribed by Merchant Shipping Act to take charge of the situation in the event of any maritime emergency

* Absence of an effective Emergency Response Plan,

* Absence of defined roles for DGMS, MEPA, SL NAVY, SLPA, NARA, etc.,

* Absence of Defined Emergency Facilities from other agencies such as Airports, Customs, Immigration, local government authorities, etc.,

* Absence of proper and sufficient facilities for such emergency response.

(Notably we did not have firefighting capability, especially with large volume high expansion foam system with high pressure pump that could be fitted on a tug with storage of at least 100 CBM foam in 1CBM Intermediate Bulk tanks that can be loaded on to supporting vessels).

* Lack of trained salvage team and equipment at the disposal of the responsible authority

* Non-availability of a mechanism to mobilise enlisted supporting vessels, equipment and personnel.

* Absence of a responsible communication mechanism

* Lack of rewarding structure for all involved in the rescue effort

Most of all, action must be taken to enhance the reputation of the country as a capable maritime nation which in turn helps the Sri Lankan maritime industry.