New-Old Foreign Policy?

by Dr Sarala Fernando

Foreign policy is usually defined in terms of the international promotion and protection of the country’s national interests which includes the projection of the country image abroad to attract aid, trade and investment cooperation. Today, with rising nationalism and in the backdrop of de-globalization, more than ever before, foreign policy-making is looking inward as seen most visibly in President Trump’s “Make America Great Again” campaign pledge. However, as practitioners can testify, “reliability” and “continuity” are also hallmarks of a robust foreign policy. This is why the style of “disruption”, familiar in business strategy and characteristic of Mr Trump, does not sit well with traditional diplomacy and has caused consternation and criticism of the US, not least from long time partners like Canada and the EU.

Yet to be fair to Mr Trump, he is carrying out his election pledges, building the controversial wall on the border with Mexico, re-negotiating or taking the US out of multilateral agreements which were considered unfavourable to US interests whether on trade or climate change, stopping funding of UN organizations (like WHO) whose operational behavior was considered inimical to US interests, finding a “permanent” solution to the Middle East question including by moving the US Embassy to Jerusalem, working towards bringing American soldiers back home from old theatres of war like the Korean peninsular and Afghanistan etc. Despite the criticism from home and abroad, President Trump has persisted in his roller coaster course, probably propelled by the need to cultivate his main constituent voting blocs before the November Presidential election, ignoring the calls for global accommodation.

In this background, it is perhaps not surprising that on the heels of resounding election results, reversals on foreign policy appear to be also taking place in Sri Lanka. However the problem is that before the elections, there had been a general consensus among all the political parties as to the value of Sri Lanka’s traditional non-aligned foreign policy. President Gotabaya’s visionary speech at Ruwanvelisaya had moreover outlined a policy of “neutrality” to avoid being sucked into power rivalry, friendship- with- all in the expectation of reciprocal respect for our sovereignty (mutuality principle) and open to the need for international cooperation including with the UN on the SDGs . This speech should be made available on the Foreign Ministry website as it sets out important foreign policy objectives.

In that context, eyebrows were raised in Sri Lanka when newly appointed Foreign Secretary Admiral Professor Jayanath Colombage in the course of his first press interviews referred to Sri Lanka’s new strategic security policy as having an “India first” approach while adding that Colombo would remain open to dealing with other key players for “economic development”. Speculation is rife whether this means a departure from non-alignment which traditionally includes such provisions as non- participation in foreign military pacts, non- stationing of military bases and foreign troops on its soil etc. With Maldives recently entering into a security pact with the US, the question many are asking is whether the ‘new policy’ pronouncement by Foreign Secretary Colombage is a precursor to Sri Lanka signing the pending security and development agreements with the US (ACSA, SOFA and MCC) which had become so controversial in the eyes of the public. This speculation is also linked to the recent signing by the Maldives of a security pact with the US. It is said that India had been supportive of this new development despite some press commentary in India about the “crowding” of security interests in the Indian Ocean. India has lately become a major source of funds for the Maldives, thereby countering the early Chinese influence.

To give the affable Foreign Secretary his due, perhaps the phrase “putting India first” was just awkward, suggesting a courteous “kowtow” to a big neighbour, intended to reassure India that its security concerns would be addressed on a priority basis. However, with regard to the well known Indian complaint of Chinese submarines arriving in Sri Lanka unannounced, could these concerns have been better addressed by enacting a transparent and clear policy on port calls as suggested by former Foreign Secretary Palihakkara?

The central problem here is that for many years Sri Lanka’s bilateral relations with India have been characterized as driven more by competition than by cooperation on a gamut of issues such that people are just plain distrustful of our giant neighbour. Soon after independence there were the issues of illicit immigration and contraband smuggling from India, the settling of the maritime border, the disputed sovereignty over Kachchativu and citizenship for the indentured labour from India. In the last three matters, bilateral diplomatic negotiations, complex and lengthy were eventually brought to conclusion, with India being persuaded to move on some of the more difficult points of contention such as its initial refusal to take back any of its citizens. I will not touch on the troubled relationship during the conflict years which my colleague John Gooneratne has amply documented in his book as the “Decade of Confrontation”. While the bilateral relationship can be managed, for better or worse, there remains the need to accept that, looking back on the diplomatic history, more often than not, respective national interests have diverged, so that careful identification of our national interests and building domestic public support for foreign policy changes, becomes key.

Centre-State politics have complicated India’s relations with its neighbours as pointed out by many academics and some commentators have argued that, of late, bilateral relations have deteriorated over new legislation brought in by the Modi government altering the status of Jammu and Kashmir, thereby affecting Pakistan, imposing restrictions affecting the residence status of those from neighboring states such as Bangladesh and developments on defining of the border affecting Nepal. But the Modi government has the strength of its parliamentary majority in Delhi which enables it to divorce foreign policy-making from centre-state politics. Perhaps this is why India has recently been able to offer Sri Lanka not only military training but also arms and equipment, judging by press reports on the prospects for increased bilateral security cooperation.

This leaves observers wondering whether Foreign Secretary Colombage’s “kowtow” had domestic political undertones and was intended to soften India’s stance with regard to the current campaign in Sri Lanka to amend the 13th Amendment? However India has always reiterated in its official statements the call for a full implementation of 13A which arose out of the 1987 Indo- Sri Lanka Agreement to Establish Peace and Normalcy in Sri Lanka.

On this matter, it should be remembered that India drives a hard bargain in respect of bilateral relations with its neighbours and it is difficult to see how they will retreat from the 1987 Agreement which has been interpreted as imposing a “lock” on Sri Lanka’s security policy and the use of its ports through the “secret” Annexures. One does not talk much today of these Annexures because they reflect India’s anxiety at the time over the US presence and its military bases in the Indian Ocean, which position has been totally reversed in the current era with India and the US becoming strategic security partners.

There has also been recent references in Sri Lanka to the 1971 Indian Ocean as Zone of Peace proposal made by Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike to the UN. However, this proposal has a historic context being linked to the expulsion of the indigenous inhabitants of Diego Garcia to make way for an American naval base. The IOPZ initiative eventually lost steam in the UN coming up against the doctrines of freedom of navigation on the high seas for all ships guaranteed by the 1958 Law of the Sea Convention. In Sri Lanka too there was opposition by those who argued that IOPZ was designed to keep extra- regional naval powers out of the Indian Ocean, and would have the effect of leaving room for regional powers to hold sway, at least two of them holding nuclear weapons. A different situation existed in South East Asia where ZOPFAN or Nuclear Free Zone of Peace worked as a confidence building measure for mutual security among members of ASEAN precisely because none of the ASEAN countries held nuclear weapons.

There is also difficulty in accepting Foreign Secretary Colombage’s view that there could be a separation between security and economic interests in developing bilateral relations with nations. India finally moved towards liberalizing its economy in the early 1990’s and since then it has been possible to build synergies with Sri Lanka, as seen in the ISLFTA and increased investment etc. However, looking back at the time of the armed conflict, which country helped us with our security needs, from planes to arms, ammunition and equipment ? Which “old friend” stood with us at the UN ready to help us even in the Security Council if need should arise when human rights attacks inspired by elements of the Tamil diaspora, were launched by the West over the conduct of the war? Can we forget the lessons of history while moving forward the “new” on the “old” security policy?

With much talk today of the impending new Cold War and the looming conflict between the US and China, priority should instead be given to carefully balance both bilateral relationships and avoid any impression of “taking sides”. In this background, there has been some speculation about the new diplomatic appointments to India and China. On the one hand, a former Minister, close to President Gotabaya, with strong personal connections to the US, given Cabinet rank ( a first in Sri Lanka) and posted to New Delhi as opposed to a charming light-weight to Beijing, whose appointment as Foreign Secretary broke the string of professional appointments from within the Foreign Service. While Delhi may be pleased to see the new appointment as a downgrading of the Sri Lanka- China relationship, what would be the reaction in Beijing?

( –  re ref to Palitha Kohona as reputed to have been a representative for a Chinese  company – I just thought it sounds “catty” . Although I saw this info in various press articles previously before the appointment was announced, in the present context it seems to have been wiped out of the cv etc on the net so best leave it out.

(Sarala Fernando PhD, retired from the Foreign Ministry as Additional Secretary and her last Ambassadorial appointment was as Permanent Representative to the UN in Geneva. She writes now on foreign affairs, diplomacy and protection of heritage).