May 11th indefinite hartal: lessons of Tahrir Revolution

By Dr. DAYAN JAYATILLEKA

I was lucky to address a group of student veterans of Tahrir 1. They were Arab students who had studied and were studying at the Sorbonne, Paris. The occasion was made possible by a young Sri Lankan I had recruited as Research officer of the Sri Lanka Embassy Paris, when I served as Ambassador. A postgrad with degrees from Sorbonne and Science Po, she was keen that I address her fellow postgrads at the faculty of Law at the Sorbonne. Among them were leaders who had returned from their mother country across the Mediterranean, to France, and their classes after participating prominently in the Tahrir Square uprising.

In the course of my remarks and the ensuing discussion I urged them to make a comparative study of revolutions, including the classic French Revolution, cautioning them of the need to prepare for two possible endgames: elections and military counter-revolution. Several of them were inclined to boycott elections unless a Constitution to their liking was put in place. They preferred to fight for that Constitution. Others were aware of the dangers of counter-revolution and even expected it but were unsure of what quarter it could come from—the Islamists or the military.

The story ended tragically. Elections brought the Islamic Brotherhood of Muhammed Morsi to power, and the youth went back to Tahrir Square (Tahrir 2) to protest against the conservative sociocultural intolerance of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Tahrir 2 was instrumentalised by the military, which tossed out the elected Muslim Brotherhood, seized power, contested and won elections in civilian suit (El Sisi) and jailed the youngsters who had participated in Tahrir 1 and 2, crushing the Movement and imposing a tighter rule than had been in place even under Mubarak.

What the brave, brilliant young leaders of the Tahrir protests failed to do was to build a political movement that could intervene politically in the endgame. The military proved to be better at political strategy.

ARAGALAYA and HARTAL

Following its unprecedentedly successful mass protest of April 28th, the joint Trade Union Coordinating Committee has announced a two-point or double-barrelled plan of action. It is an eminently legitimate and progressive endeavour to secure the departure of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, his clan and his regime.

It also has potential gaps which have to be addressed if the result is not to be the opposite of what is expected.

The double-barrelled plan is firstly, a General Strike centric Hartal on May 6th. If it fails to convince Gotabaya Rajapaksa to vacate the Presidency, the struggle will escalate to the next level of an open-ended General Strike and Hartal starting May 11th.

The plan is logical and I said earlier, entirely legitimate. However, there are strategic, tactical and logistical problems which have to be addressed.

The Great Hartal (“Maha Hataalaya“) of August 1953, was criminally called-off by its leaders the LSSP and the CPSL at a time the Cabinet had vacated to a US ship anchored in the harbour. Everything bad that happened in the country, starting with Sinhala only in 1956 can be traced to that original betrayal.

Therefore, it is commendable that the leadership of this 21st century Hartal, the Trade Union Coordinating Committee is strategising a double-tap, May 6th and May 11th, with the latter continuing until victory.

However, the stakes are so high that the risk of failure should be minimised. The gaps I see as having to be plugged are as follows:

1. The Hartal of August 1953 had an identifiable political leadership/s: the LSSP and the CPSL. While the JVP and FSP are represented in the Coordinating Committee, there is no overarching political front or bloc that is visible to the nation.

2. There is an unevenness between the industrial and agrarian, the urban and rural fronts. The original and most widespread grievance was that of the peasantry. Marx insisted at one point that the formula for success was that the workers struggle should be “backed by a second edition of the Peasants War”. If the Hartal starting May 11th is to be successful, the peasants front must be as active as the workers front.

3. Quite apart from the lack of a visible, coordinated political leadership, there is also the absence of a People’s Bloc which brings together all the main organisations of the various streams of the Aragalaya: the youth, the students, workers, peasants, women, religious clergy, artists, professionals, and perhaps the ‘national bourgeoisie’ or ‘liberal bourgeoisie’ i.e., the supportive business community.

4. A reassessment has to be made of the various modes of struggle in each sector. For instance, if the workers in the power sector are pulled out, the resultant hardship may cause the public to swing against the struggle and pivot to welcoming intervention by the armed forces (as happened with the health and transport strikes in 1989).

5. Always be aware that the enemy can escalate beyond what you can, because the enemy commands the armed forces and the military can even by itself, choose to intervene and seize power. It is vital to grasp that where there is Revolution, however latent, there is also Counter-Revolution. There must be no adventurist opening provided for military Counter-revolution.