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Letters from the past

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File Photo of Ban Ki-moon, UN SG with President Mahinda Rajapaksa

By Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha

In the context of Lord Naseby’s recent launch of his book about Sri Lanka, where which G L Peiris delivered an uncharacteristically passionate attack on the hypocrisy of the British government, I thought I should look here at how we blundered endlessly in dealing with the major political problem this country has faced for the last decade, namely the publication of the Darusman Report and our failure to respond to it clearly.

As soon as it came out, I told the Foreign Ministry to take up its substance with the UN, but that was when they were pretending that nothing untoward had happened. Instead of answering allegations, Gotabaya and Basil Rajapaksa went their separate ways in recording their views as to what had happened, with no substantial arguments to refute allegations. When I told Gotabaya this, when he asked me to comment on the text his people had prepared, he agreed that something should be done but that it was not his business. He said he had delegated that to the Chief of Defence Staff, Roshan Goonetilleke, who however told me that he had received no such commission, but, in any case, he did not have the resources to do this.

And, so, the criticism of our actions turned into gospel truth.

Over the years that followed I tried to stir our lethargic officials into action, but nothing came of this letter, sent to the then Secretary of the Ministry of External Affairs, at the same time as I wrote to several others. I have collated it with the rest, in a document that I sent to Shamindra Ferdinando, the only journalist who then and now tried consistently to stir government into action, from the perspective of someone who had followed the war closely and understood how unfair the allegations were – but who also increasingly despaired of the lethargy of government.

I had drafted the queries for the Ministry of External Affairs, but it was not interested and told me to send them myself. I did pass them on to the Resident Coordinator, but I had no status and, though he told me he had passed them on, there was of course no response from Ban Ki-moon.

Why Mahinda Rajapaksa, who had fought the war ably, did nothing to defend the country from these attacks, still beggars belief. But he had surrounded himself with people who believed that by reassuring him they could enhance their own positions.

As the queries make clear, there was enough evidence from internal UN records – which the Darusman Panel ignored – to make clear that their allegations were made up of selective reports from minor personnel.

From a letter sent to the Ministry of External Affairs in July 2011

It will be helpful, for the sake of reconciliation alone, to challenge the impact created by these events. In particular, I believe that we should ensure correction of those aspects that are clearly misleading of what is erroneously referred to as a UN report. At the same time, we should treat seriously aspects that are not inaccurate and that create an adverse impression.

This can be done more easily if we have made sure that errors are eradicated and clarification provided with regard to matters that are obscure or suggest inadequate understanding of realities. I have in several publications drawn attention to errors, and I believe a summation of these should be brought to the attention of the UN Secretary General. At the same time, he should be asked to respond to the queries on the attached page, since they bear on the credibility of the report as it has been compiled. I have several others, following close scrutiny of the report, but these will be enough for the moment.

I raise these because I believe we have not responded effectively to slurs that can irretrievably damage the reconciliation process if allowed to go unchecked. At present we simply react to relentless criticisms, without addressing its root causes. While I can understand reluctance to respond to the substance of an inappropriate report, there is nothing to prevent us questioning the methodology used.

I hope very much that you will be able to proceed on these lines or similar ones. Yours sincerely

1. Did the Panel consult the heads of UN agencies in Sri Lanka with regard to the various allegations contained in the Panel report, and in particular those concerning

a) Alleged rape

b) Deliberate deprival of humanitarian assistance

c) Unnecessary suffering for the displaced

d) Lack of information about rehabilitation sites?

It would be useful to ask the UN Secretary General to circulate the letter of the UN Resident Coordinator with regard to conditions at the camps, and request reports from him as well as the heads of the WFP and UNHCR with regard to these matters. In particular the UN Secretary General should be asked to share with the panel the reports of the various protection agencies that functioned during this period.

2. Did the Panel consult the head of the ICRC with regard to the various allegations contained in the Panel report, and in particular those concerning

a) Transportation of the wounded and others from conflict areas to government hospitals, and the treatment received by these

b) Transportation of food and other supplies to the conflict area

c) Information provided by the ICRC to government about conditions in the conflict area, and in particular the establishment and operation of medical centres

It would be useful to ask the UN Secretary General to circulate the letter of the ICRC head to the navy regarding its support for ICRC operations, and to request reports from him with regard to these matters.

3. Were there reports prepared by the UN or the ICRC which were shared with the panel, but which were not provided to government?

4. Did the UN set up a ‘networks of observers who were operational in LTTE-controlled areas’, as claimed in the report. Was this with the authority of the UN Resident Coordinator, and how did it fit within the UN mandate? With whom were its reports shared?

5. Did the UN obtain other reports from international UN employees in Sri Lanka, and were these with the authority of the UN Resident Coordinator? How did these fit within the UN mandate? If these reports were intended to improve the condition of affected Sri Lankans, why were they not shared at the time with government?

6. Did the Panel consult the UN Special Representative on the Rights of the Displaced, Prof Walter Kalin, and use the reports he published? Were they aware that he visited Sri Lanka three times during this period?

7. Will the Panel explain errors such as the attribution to government of actions relating to the LTTE (Footnote 92), the attribution to government of an inappropriate response (at the end of January) to an ICRC statement issued on February 1st, the assumption that food was only sent to the conflict zone through the ICRC, the attribution (though obscurely) to the terrorist associated Tamil Rehabilitation Organization of the claim that individuals died of starvation, the claim that Manik Farm did not have its own water source, the claim that psychological support was not allowed by the Ministry of Social Services, etc?

8. Will the Panel study the analysis of its claims with regard to attacks on hospitals, in the light of claims made at the time, and in the context of official ICRC documentation of what was conveyed to government?

9. Will the Panel explain its selective characterization of participants in the conflict, including its description of the LTTE as disciplined, while bribery is attributed to the military as a whole, with positive actions being attributed to individuals?

10. Will the Panel provide sources for the various estimates mentioned in Para 133, as well as all alternative estimates with regard to the given figures? Will it also explain the sentence ‘Depending on the ratio of injuries to deaths, estimated at various times to be 1:2 or 1:3, this could point to a much higher casualty figure’ and how it relates to the figure of 75,000 given immediately afterwards?

11. Will the Panel explain what it means when it uses the word ‘Government’, and in particular its source for various critical comments such as those in Paras, 131 and 136 and Footnote 77?

12. Has the Panel studied the reports of UN committees which make clear the reluctance of agencies entrusted with funds for the benefit of Sri Lankan displaced citizens to upgrade facilities at Manik Farm despite numerous requests, as well as the manner in which funding was squandered on international personnel who were unable to ensure adherence to national and international standards with regard to sanitation?

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