Downhill after 2009 victory

By Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha

Though obviously the current mess in the country is exceptionally bad, the rot has been going on for a very long time. This was brought home to me vividly when I had home for dinner an African friend who had served in Geneva in 2009 and been a solid supporter when we were under attack by several Western countries. He said that had seemed the highest point of Sri Lankan diplomacy whereas now he saw us lower than we had ever been.

What went wrong?

I have often observed that the rot began almost immediately when Mahinda Rajapaksa sacked Dayan and replaced him with someone who totally ignored the coalition he had built to defend us. But I have not closely explored the reasons for that dismissal in that while it was obvious Mahinda was being pressured by several of those he relied on, more foolishly than he did on Dayan given the internationalisation that had taken place, the exact responsibility of those concerned seemed beyond precise understanding.

Dayan himself was convinced that Gota was the moving force behind the dismissal. He felt by then that Gota was a disaster, a feeling he has not swerved from since then, whereas I was not convinced. It seemed sad to me that whereas in 2007 we had both thought Gota by far the most able of the brothers, and had in fact discussed the possibility of Basil positioning himself instead as the successor, two years later Dayan viewed both of them as equally incapable of statesmanship.

Ironically, the diehard nationalists blamed Dayan for what they claimed was dragooning Mahinda into indulgence towards the Indians whereas it was in fact both Gota and Basil who along with Lalith Weeratunge signed an agreement with India before the final victory in the war. It was totally shameful that none of them thereafter made it clear that Dayan was not responsible for this; nor was he responsible for the communique Mahinda issued together with Ban ki Moon just before the special session in Geneva.

Indeed, only Dayan and I registered that the commitment to address concerns about the war that Mahinda made could lead to problems whereas Prasad Kariyawasam, who managed thereafter to win favour from all regimes, assured me that it was not the case. Dayan was instructed to use that communique which contributed to the immense victory Sri Lanka achieved in Geneva. Unfortunately, neither Dayan nor I ever thought that Mahinda would welsh on that agreement, setting up a Commission only after Ban ki Moon in despair had set up his own, and then failing to fulfil its recommendations. This was despite C R de Silva having presented them in a way that would have enabled us to get rid of the sword of Damocles that has hung over us for the last decade.

What went wrong with Mahinda? Why did he make not just Ban ki Moon bitter, but also the Indians who had stood by us so forcefully during the war? Why did the consummate politician give in to those who understood nothing of international realities, nor the economic problems that would arise if we alienated all our major trading partners?

Dayan had told me long before this happened about what he described as the Brotherhood, extremists loyal to Gota who thought they could model themselves on Israel – which was very bitter about Dayan and had almost got him sacked three months earlier, a disaster which was thankfully averted, or else the West would have stopped us in our tracks through resolutions in Geneva before the war ended. But Israel was assured then that Dayan would be dismissed after the war ended, and that is what happened.

At this point, I should add that a major contributory factor to our relentless decline since then is the fact that hardly anyone in senior positions dares to criticise decisions made at the top. I was the only one who had worked with Dayan who spoke to him after what was seen as his fall from grace. The other exception was Mahinda himself, who made much of him when he finally returned to Sri Lanka, and said when Dayan mentioned how he had been ignored that of course that would have been done by those who had treated him so badly.

When I urged Mahinda to make further use of Dayan, he did appoint him to Paris, but he did not defend him against the persecution of those who by then ran foreign policy, and ran us into the ground. While this was being done, the Brotherhood ensured that nothing was done about reconciliation, about fulfilling vital recommendations of the LLRC, and worst of all about maintaining Indian support.

I think Mahinda did not know what was happening, for he did on occasion say things that suggested he had no idea that the establishment was determined to avoid reconciliation initiatives. And, he did after the first debacle in Geneva ensure that there was an Action Plan on the LLRC recommendations. But then he lapsed into lethargy again and did not ensure follow up so that despite the best efforts of Dhara Wijayathilaka and Anura Dissanayake, vital areas were left untouched.

It is of course possible that Mahinda told me what he thought I wanted to hear and had no qualms about the failure to reconcile. He is after all a consummate actor. But Dayan, like me, thinks that he was not responsible for the extent of neglect, though of course he was culpable for it was after all his commitments that he was flouting, and thus endangering the country of which he was President.

Dayan has no doubt that Gota was the villain of the peace, though I was not so sure, for Gota did tell me that he had urged an early Provincial Council election in the north, and it was Basil who had given Mahinda contrary advice. Mahinda himself told me that Gota had told him not to go for an early presidential election, a Pavlovian response that presidents from the days of JR’s disastrous Third Amendment have engaged in whenever they feel that their parliamentary majorities are in danger.

The bankruptcy for which the seeds were sown during Mahinda’s second term as President will have to be discussed in another article. But suffice it to say here, where I have concentrated on the political disasters that followed thick and fast on our war victory, that the recourse to elections when feeling insecure meant of course that Mahinda engaged in populism that cost a lot. This was not only in terms of money spent and permanent unproductive jobs created, but also of the enormous expenditure elections lead to in this country, expenditure which is recouped through greater corruption.