Day three of April 1971 insurrection, on duty at Hambantota/Kataragama

by Capt F.R.A.B.Musafer 4th Regt SLA (Retd)

Very early in the morning the OIC Inspector Arthanayake informed us that the Katargama Police station had been attacked but was successfully repulsed. We immediately proceeded towards Kataragama. When near the Tissa rest house I heard a shot that happened to be a rifle being discharged. This was an unfortunate incident, a mentally retarded person happened to break the curfew and when challenged had run away and was fired upon killing him.It was harrowing sight to see a family member wailing over the dead body. I felt bad that this incident happened in broad daylight and unnecessarily. The police arrived at the scene soon after and asked us to proceed to Kataragama.

Months later unknown to me this death had been investigated by the Field Security Division. This was a division that was created in 1970 to provide for the security of the Prime Minister and it also screened applicants hoping to join the armed services and among other things the anonymous petitions against serving service personnel of other political affiliations.

The FSD was headed by Major Denzil Kobekadduwa who was a political victim of the previous regime but as all and sundry knew was a perfect officer and gentleman. In 1970 on his return to the Army he captained the Army rugger team having already captained the Kandy Sports Club and represented Sri Lanka.

During his period of interdiction he was not allowed to enter any Army establishment or premises and as a result the Army vs. Kandy Sports Club Clifford Cup matches had to be played on neutral grounds and many a serving officer dared not be even seen with him. This was not the case when he was reinstated and exerted plenty of influence with the government in power. During the insurgency he was in England following a staff officers course.

The inquiry may have been instigated by an anonymous petition or on the strength of what happened in Kataragama later under Lt Alfred Wijesuriya (a volunteer army officer) where the local beauty queen, Miss Premawathie Manamperi, alleged to be a JVP sympathiser was allegedly raped, shot and left to die in a shallow grave. It transpired later that the bullet that killed her was fired by a soldier to put her out of her misery.

Lt Wijesuriya was found guilty of attempted murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. He suffered a fatal heart attack and died in prison a few years later. It was reported that the co-accused was murdered on his release from prison at Matara.

I was totally unaware that an investigation to the death at Tissamaharama was conducted until conveyed to me by one in the FSD unit who happened to be a rugby player a year later when I captained the Army rugby team in 1972. There were no formal charges laid which I presume cleared me of any blame for this death. Nevertheless it was an unfortunate and needless death under my watch that remains as a scar in my mind and conscience.

On our way to Kataragama which was not under my area of operations, we encountered a bus load of students from Trinity College who happened to have stayed overnight at Kataragama I can’t recall if they had witnessed or seen anything. Although a curfew was in operation we allowed them to proceed and make their way to Hambantota. They were put up by the GA till it was safe to return to Kandy.

At Kataragama we found the Police station had been attacked. The power and telephone lines had been cut. The police had been prepared and had successfully repulsed the attack. We were told that an injured insurgent had taken refuge in a nearby temple and proceeded towards the temple. Sitting at the entrance was this young man staring in a daze, bare bodied in a sarong with his hands across his blood soaked and swollen face. He had a bullet lodged in his face that had not exited and was in great pain.

I assumed this would have been from a semi automatic weapon or a shotgun pellet. There were some locals around but they were quite calm and showed no signs of any anger but pity. The police who accompanied me on the other hand suggested that I bump him off. They had an impression that the Army had the license to kill. I very politely told them that I could not do so and that I had to account for every round of ammunition. Much to their disappointment we took him and dropped him off at the Tissa Hospital.

Later in the day we headed for Hambantota and heard through our regimental wireless link that the Polonnaruwa police station had been attacked and the army had killed many insurgents. They had been dressed in blue uniforms and had come in buses. Speaking to Lt Lionel Balagalla months later, he told me he had heard of the attack at Wellawaya on the regimental net and on April 5 evening was tipped off that the Polonnaruwa police station was to be attacked and as a result was prepared for it.

The insurgents walked into a trap set up by the police and the army and as a result suffered very heavy losses. The siege went on till the early hours of April 6. Lionel told me that the resolve of the insurgents was strong, demonstrated by an insurgent who was seriously wounded and dying but still trying to grasp a homemade bomb and throw it .

He also told me that there was a magisterial inquiry held that day as this was the first time in the history of Sri Lanka that so many were killed by the army and police in an internal security operation. The use of weapons in any IS operation had a cardinal rule that the “minimum of force” was to be exercised at all times. The strategy of the insurgents was to overrun the police station with a human wave, they certainly had the superior numbers though not the weapons and were mowed down by rifle and machine gun fire.

Lionel was glad of the inquiry as he was fearful of the repercussions if this was an isolated incident. He treasured the piece of paper that cleared him of any wrong doing although the numbers did not tally to an article written later by a police officer who put the number at over 130. There were no mass graves, the bodies were cremated in the cemetery with probably no record of their identities. Lt Lionel Balagalla ended his military career as the Army Commander and retired as a Lieutenant General .

Weerawila abandoned on April 7

We totally abandoned Weerawila and moved into the Hambantota police station from which we would operate as a mobile force and patrol the area at night. There were reports that there were many police stations that had fallen to insurgent hands and more attacks expected. It was not an encouraging picture. That night we continued to patrol the roads aided by dusk to dawn curfews that was a common occurrence.

News was coming through that the Warakapola police station together with several other police stations had fallen. It was a very worrying situation. We were tuning in to BBC, ABC and the Voice of America for news on a world transistor owned by a gunner. Local radio were guarded in the news conveyed.

Communications were difficult as our battery operated radio equipment could not be charged as there was no electricity, this was previously done at the CTB depot at Kataragama. We were worried that if the police stations were overrun we would be isolated and even contemplated an exit strategy by sea. There was not much a single platoon could do.

Hambantota April 8

In a wireless conversation the adjutant Capt Samarakoon in very flattering and in unbelievable terms said that I was the ‘ Supreme Commander of Hambantota” and was no longer to take orders from the Government Agent. He had a tendency to exaggerate but I was flabbergasted as I was only a lieutenant with only a platoon under my command and a big responsibility shoved on my shoulders to oversee an entire district.

He mentioned that coordinating officers were to be appointed and till such time I was to take charge and take any action I thought fit. I conveyed this communication to the GA who was taken by surprise as he had not received anything official to this effect and asked me if he had done something wrong. I told him that the situation island wide had deteriorated to such an extent that total military intervention was necessary and assured him it was not a coup. He assured me of all the support he could extend.

Denzil Kobekadduwa

There were many curfews enforced from time to time. Some for a period of 24 hours which caused a lot of hardship and inconvenience more so for the townsfolk rather than those in the villages. As water was a commodity in short supply in Hambantota, parents opted to send their children to collect water having instructed them to raise their hands at the sight of an army patrol. We had to turn a blind eye to enforcing the curfew. Rumours were afloat that the curfew was imposed to facilitate the receipt of weapons from foreign sources and to consolidate the positions in the ground with some foreign troops..

Some of the police stations were ordered to withdraw to Hambantota and Tangalle.

Reinforcements from Colombo on April 9

On the morning of April 9 I was informed that there were two volunteer platoons being sent to assist me to take back Tissamaharama supposedly in insurgent hands. and then move to Tangalle by nightfall. Meanwhile we received the news that Capt Noel Weerakoon had been killed in an ambush on April 8 at Rambewa/Welioya together with bombadier Munasinghe and the civilian driver of the jeep.

He and his troops were being airlifted to Anuradhpura but as the airfield was in the hands of the insurgents the plane was diverted to Vavuniya. Alternative arrangements were made to travel to Anuradhapura by road. Determined to reach his objective he made the fatal decision to travel at night. His dedication and commitment to follow orders cost him his life. His body was retrieved from the riverbed at the site of the ambush by sergeant Ameer who had returned the enemy fire and caused the insurgents to retreat.

It was Capt Weerakoon’s men I was commanding and that was a devastating blow to them, a much loved officer. It affected their morale and also brought to our realization that the situation was becoming a serious problem with the army and police on the back foot.

Lt Mohan Mootatamby was recalled from his deployment at Hingurakgoda and sent to take over command of the platoon which was at Vavuniya. He was the sole passenger of an Air Ceylon plane, something he was very proud of stating that no one else ever had that privilege as a lieutenant let alone a general or even a head of state.

There was talk that the army cantonment at Panagoda had been attacked and it was later confirmed that Gunner Beckmeyer had been killed by friendly fire at the panic and confusion that prevailed in the vicinity of the artillery officers mess. If there really was an insurgent attack on the cantonment is unknown to me. There were many unconfirmed reports of police stations being withdrawn or taken over by the JVP.

That afternoon the two volunteer platoons arrived in Hambantota under the command of Lt Alfred Wijesuriya and Lt Gallapatti. The meeting was not a cordial one as Lt Wijesuriya refused to take orders from me. I was taken aback at his decision and was also not impressed by the beret he wore, one worn by the French Resistance fighters. He insisted that he was to report to the GA to which I responded by taking him to the wireless set and contacted Capt Samarakoon who once again confirmed that I was in charge; and the Supreme Commander, protocol was, though senior in age and equal in rank I was his senior by virtue of being a regular officer.

A few hours later we made plans to proceed to Tissamaharama. Before I left the Divisional Revenue Officer came up to me with a glass of gin and tonic saying that he might never see me alive again. Tired as I was I had to refuse his kind offer. He was wrong, there was no opposition whatsoever. It was ghost town with hardly a person in sight. The town had not been taken over but simply abandoned and untouched since the police had withdrawn. Having reached the main town square I drove past the town to see if the areas ahead were safe and secure whilst the volunteer troops had alighted from their vehicles.

On my return I was shocked to see some volunteer troops and a few policeman looting the shops. They had in their hands bales of cloth and whatever was worthwhile. I told Lt Wijesuriya that his men were looting to which he replied that ‘Let them take what they want’. This was something I could not tolerate and I reacted by cocking my sterling sub machine gun and shouting out that “I would shoot anybody who did not return the goods they had taken;” they all responded by walking back to the shops that had been broken into and replaced the goods.

Among them was a police driver whom I knew as a youngster. He o had worked with my father was sheepishly returning the cash box still intact with the money inside. Soon after the chairman of the Town council appeared on the scene whose cooperation I sought to seal the doors of the shops broken into. An incident like this did not augur well, as proved subsequently with the murder of the local beauty queen.

Having done that we drove to the Tissa police station where the two volunteer unit platoons were to take up positions that night They appeared to be inexperienced and lacking in basic military skills. I suppose it was the first time that they were deployed in this role as the volunteers would have in the past been used in noncombatant roles of static guards providing security to key installations. This was a different scenario as it was an attacking unconventional force we were encountering.

firozm@optusnet.com.au