Confrontations with public protests: Lessons and inconsistencies

by Merril Gunaratne 

This narrative could commence with the current wave of public protests which began in March 2022, and is yet in motion. The efforts by protesters to intimidate the former president in close proximity to his Mirihana, Nugegoda residence on March 31, 2022, was it’s beginning. On May 9, 2022, mobs encouraged by those in power at the time, attacked peaceful protesters at the Galle Face Green in the gaze of the police who were gripped by apathy. Police again failed on the same night when mobs caused murder and mayhem in many parts of the country.

The role of the police in dealing with public unrest

Dealing with public disorder is the responsibility of the police. Agitations in streets and public places of trade and student unions and even members of the public provoked by harsh living conditions have to be dispersed by the police which is the main bulwark against lawlessness. Police must arrive promptly at scenes of unrest and take steps to restore normalcy. They are in possession of arms to help adoption of “minimum force” wherever necessary. Should firearms be justifiably necessary, police are empowered to use them in order to restore law and order.

The army, when mobilized, would carry firearms. It may not be an exaggeration to say that the use of firepower is justified only if a serious threat to life and limb emerges from agitators.

In any field of activity, more so to repulse mobs and agitations, the concept of “a single point of control” or a unitary command is vital for efficacy. Coordination and cohesion would be best served if the role of the overall commander is not diluted. Proof that the army was required only to assist the police at Galle Face Green on May 9, 2022, is the fact that a senior army officer was not named to be the overall commander of the police and the army. Senior DIG of Western Province was therefore in total control of the police, with the army deployed to assist the police.

Police inadequacies

In hindsight, it is difficult to comprehend why the police at Mirihana failed to disperse the protesters who initially appeared peaceful. They, apparently emboldened by police tolerance, became more boisterous shortly after and proceeded to torch vehicles. Notwithstanding the extent to which the former president had lost popularity due to prevailing conditions in the country, the police cannot be excused for failing to disperse hostile numbers within proximity of the residence of a head of state and government.

Even if a few hostile elements assemble near the house of an ordinary citizen, the latter is entitled to summon police assistance. The mere presence and conduct of a hostile group could be construed as “intimidation”. The failure of the police to disperse the threatening presence of large numbers in proximity to the residence of the president is inexcusable. Such failure served as an impetus for the assembly of large numbers that followed at Galle Face Green.

Police had actually thereafter abetted the perpetration of violence on the morning of May 9, 2022 by outsiders. In the aftermath of such failures , there were efforts by Deshabandu Tennakoon, Senior DIG of Western Province and the IGP to shift responsibility for police failures to each other. The position adopted by Senior DIG [WP] was that he was restrained from acting against the miscreants who invaded the Galle Face Green, by the IGP.

In all situations  of public disorder or lawlessness, the responsibility to take decisions and act to restore order, is entirely with the senior commander [Senior DIG WP in this case] on the spot. He has to assess the situation, decide on a suitable course of action consistent with the law, and adopt steps to restore normalcy. When so engaged, he has to disregard all extraneous considerations. He is the main actor on the stage, and cannot falter in performance, as he has to justify his actions in a court of law. He cannot go to courts and state in mitigation that he was influenced to act in a particular way by a superior distant from the scene.

It may be in context to state that when confronted by lawless elements led by Cyril Mathew trespassing into Vidyalankara University in 1978 and in Polgahawela in 1979 when MP Sunil Ranjan Jayakody led the mob, I took decisions on my own to deal with the situation. So also during the Muslim – Sinhala riots in Beruwala in 1991, the ‘hostage’ drama at Biyagama in 1993, intimidation of Americans employed at Voice of America radio station at Iranawila, Chilaw, in early 1990s. I would have considered it inappropriate to dilly dally awaiting orders from above. The habit of seeking instructions from those not at scenes of unrest was more an exception in our time.

One such exception deserves narration. In 1990’s, when WB Rajaguru was IGP, a DIG in Ratnapura, confronted by a mob threatening to invade the police station had phoned the IGP to seek instructions. I was called up by the IGP to discuss the matter. It was agreed after discussion, that he should inform the DIG to take suitable decisions without seeking advice since he was the officer at the scene. The DIG concerned was advised accordingly.

Police also failed on the night of May 9, 2022. Most of the violence which occurred in many parts of the country could not have surprised the police for what was done was committed brazenly and not in great secrecy. The months commencing from March 2022, witnessed a wave of unrest. Police, with the advantage of intelligence, should have mapped out contingency plans including mobilization of large numbers of police by day and night. At the time of writing, a news item appeared in the Sunday Island of April 2 that the Senior DIG had passed down written instructions to police on the ground to desist from carrying arms. If this is true, it may reveal the state of mind of the Senior DIG at the time.

Handling of protests under President RW

Beginning with his advent to power, police moved swiftly and effectively to deal with all protests. This campaign is yet in progress. Those in the highest echelons in Defence and Law and Order Ministries as well as the Police who now act decisively, are the same officers who served the former President. In fact, they were his appointees. It would be natural to ponder why President Wickremesinghe has succeeded, whilst his predecessor had failed. There appears to have been contrasts between the two Presidents in their style, experience and the capacity to enforce orders. This is notwithstanding the fact that the police and the defence apparatus may earlier have suffered the inhibition that the former president had been alienated from the people.

Use of firearms by Police in restoring normalcy

Currently the police are frequently being called upon to disperse protests and agitations on the streets. A significant feature of the current repulses is the patience being exercised, even in the face of repeated provocations. Not once has the police employed firearms to disperse agitations. It is evident that the Police have evolved a formula or strategy to successfully disperse protests without the need to employ guns. Police have had a history of being ‘trigger happy’ when deployed in large numbers at scenes of unrest. A peaceful protest where Buddhist monks also figured was dispersed by police opening fire in the first days of January 1966 at the cost of the loss of life of a priest.

Because of a severe public outcry, IGP S.A. Dissanayake was placed on compulsory leave by the government. In late 1990’s, the American employees of the VOA station at Iranawila, Chilaw, were regularly intimidated by villagers when traveling to and from the station. Senior DIG Gamini Randeni ordered the police to open fire on them, an excessive act that exacerbated the situation. The Senior DIG was placed on compulsory leave.

In 2011, IGP Mahinda Balasuriya erred similarly, causing an employee of the Free Trade Zone to be shot dead. He was ordered to resign from office. The army, mobilized prematurely, caused a death at Rathupaswala bringing disrepute to the government of President Mahinda Rajapaksa. More recently, during the former President’s tenure of office, Rambukkana police caused a crisis by opening fire and causing the death of a protester.

There were other cases of excessive action to curb unrest as well. The common factor or feature in most of these cases was the failure of senior officers in command to have ‘tight control’ of their subordinates who often become ’trigger happy’ when mobilized in numbers. Against this backdrop, police presently have to be commended for restraint. They appear to have sharpened control of mobilized lower ranks and infused the value of patience in testing situations.

Dispersing protests without arms should be taught in Police Training School

Current strategies by the police to exercise considerable restraint in dealing with agitations without having to use firearms, should be included in the curricula of police academies so that appropriate lessons could be imparted to trainees. I cannot remember this subject being included in training programs in our time.

The history of police apathy is the other side of the coin. Such occasions have been often dictated by political compulsions. Even in our time, there had been many instances where police had failed to discharge their lawful obligations in the face of interference by those in power. It had been commonplace in the 1980’s and 1990’s for political elements to take the law into their hands at elections, or to silence political rivals or institutions which do not promote political interests. Very often, police have come off poorly by inaction, indifference, or even by failing to arrive at scenes of turbulence. The repulse of mobs and protests had often been characterized by inconsistency.

Gone are the days when police shortcomings when addressing public unrest, are openly discussed at conferences, to ensure “performance improvement.” I am reminded of one of the former  IGP’s, Osmund de Silva summoning a conference of his DIGs’, SPs ’ and ASPs’, shortly after communal riots in 1950s amid complaints by senior officers including Sidney de Zoysa, of political interference. After a free exchange of views, the IGP in disgust walked into the cabinet room and offered his letter of resignation to Prime Minister, SWRD Bandaranaike.

The latter had to use all his powers of persuasion for the IGP to withdraw his letter. Such exemplary officers of that time stand in contrast to many of those who had wielded authority in the police subsequently. The stature of police giants like Osmund de Silva, Sidney de Zoysa and Eleric Abeygoonewardene have “gone with the wind”. The reluctance of police seniors to introduce unfettered discussions about the need to employ uniform standards in confronting mobs is possibly underpinned by concerns of self-interest. Nonetheless, strategies that are presently employed to disperse protests without use of firearms should enter training curricula in police academies. They would ensure performance improvement and save lives.

(The writer is a retired Senior DIG Police)