Features
Collective security and question of nuclear disarmament
Another epochal development has been reached in the world’s search for collective security with the adoption recently by the international community of The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). The treaty is supported by some 51 states at present with the Red Cross and Red Crescent describing the TPNW as making clear these states’ ‘refusal to accept nuclear weapons as an inevitable part of the international security architecture.’
Recent press reports said that the TPNW, ‘Explicitly and unequivocally prohibits the use, threat to use, development, production, testing and stockpiling of nuclear weapons, and it obliges all State Parties to not assist, encourage or induce anyone in any way to engage in any activity prohibited by the Treaty.’ Hopefully, states in increasing numbers would not only subscribe to the TPNW but also go on to ratify it, thereby making it absolutely obligatory on their part to observe the treaty in both letter and spirit.
The latter treaty has helped greatly in impressing on the world the urgent necessity of global de-nuclearization and expresses the moral resolve of the international community to steer clear of the development and use of nuclear weapons, but it has failed to compel the major nuclear weapon states to de-activate and destroy their nuclear weapons. This is the foremost issue the world confronts in its de-nuclearization efforts.
Put simply, the world would remain a most dangerous place to live in as long as there is no total and universal nuclear disarmament. That is, as long as the foremost powers continue to retain their nuclear weapons collective security would remain a hard to realize ideal.
However, there is no denying that treaties, such as the TPNW, would prove effective as a means of raising global awareness on the perils of nuclear weaponry, besides being embodiments of a near universal ethical awareness on the need to eliminate nuclear weapons. They could prove vital instruments in ramping-up moral pressure on nuclear weapon states.
The effectiveness of the latter task depends on the degree to which the world’s civilian publics, desirous of world peace, bring overwhelming pressure on their governments to say a decisive ‘No’ to nuclear weapons, thereby compelling the latter to initiate concrete measures to de-nuclearize and make good their pledges. This, in turn, is a question of people the world over organizing themselves into a force their governments cannot ignore. Ideally, nuclear disarmament needs to feature as an election issue. Besides, a popular anti-nuclear movement should be world wide and prove to be the evidence of universal moral pressure.
However, the exercise of people’s power of the above kind would depend vitally on the extent to which people enjoy fundamental freedoms. Needless to say, this may not be possible in authoritarian states and a number of nuclear weapon states are undemocratic in kind. Accordingly, while there is a possibility of an anti-nuclear movement gaining ground in what are seen as democratic states the same does not apply to authoritarian countries.
The above reality poses problems for anti-nuclear, popular pressure groups. These consists in the fact that nuclear power is projected by a state on the basis of the Mutually-Assured Destruction (MAD) principle. That is, nuclear weapon states competitively build-up their nuclear capability on the basis of the perception that their opponents would desist from deploying their nuclear weapons against them if they fear highly destructive reprisals.
This is the MAD logic behind competitive nuclear arms build-ups among, particularly, rival, neighbouring states. Accordingly, a democratic state would be unwilling to destroy its nuclear arsenal if its rival states, which happen to be authoritarian and ideologically opposed to it, prove reluctant to de-nuclearize. This is based on the democratic state’s apprehension that it would be deprived of its retaliatory capability if it unilaterally de-nuclearizes. Accordingly, ideally, de-nuclearization should happen simultaneously among states to be effective. But this is hard to achieve in a world of power politics.
However, anti-nuclear movements need to soldier on in the direction of progressive change. Awareness building on these questions must be sustained the world over if anti-nuclear, popular mobilizations are to prove successful even to a degree.
One area in which some gains could be made relates to the conceptual basis of national security and its implications. States usually give out that national security would be compromised if the nuclear option is not availed of. This is particularly true of antagonistic neighbouring states that engage in competitive arms build-ups. But how true is this?
It is ruling elites that create security fears in their publics. This is for the purpose of mobilizing their publics behind them and for perpetuating their power. It ought to be clear that the people gain nothing from these ruling power posturings. In fact, people lose from these ruling group ploys because states will have little or nothing to spend on human welfare if the bulk of the country’s budget is spent on nuclear arsenal build-ups disguised as national security considerations.
The above is a vital element in discussions on national security which is not sufficiently aired. But it is important that it is widely scrutinized in the context of nuclear disarmament. If publics are to challenge their governments on issues relating to nuclear disarmament they would need to focus on how national security concerns are used by ruling elites to consolidate their hold on power. Meanwhile, though, treaties, such as TPNW, need to be discussed and popularized by people’s organizations that have human security at heart rather than national security; the two are not one and the same thing.