Cold War in Indian Ocean

The Future of the Indian Ocean: The proposed building of the Kra Canal by Ramesh Somasunderam BA MA (Deakin) PhD (UWA) (Published by the author: 2021)

Reviewed by Jayantha Somasundaram

Recent events have sharply reminded us of the growing struggle for influence and power in the Indian Ocean by states, both in the region, as well as those outside of it. Dr Ramesh Somasunderam, a Sri Lanka born academic in Australia, has directed our attention to the prospect of the Kra Canal, which may well be a critical development in the political future of the Indian Ocean.

The Kra Canal, should it be constructed, would be the third canal to link two oceans, following the Suez Canal which was opened in 1869, and the Panama Canal opened in 1914. The Kra Canal, should it materialise, would need to be 195km long and constructed across the Kra Isthmus in southern Thailand, linking the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea and thereby shortening the travel time between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean.

Currently the shortest passage between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans is across the Malacca Straits, a passageway busier than either the Panama Canal or the Suez Canal. The Kra Canal would cut this travel distance by 1,200km.

The Indian Ocean Peace Zone

During colonial times, the Indian Ocean was a British lake because London ensured control of all its strategic points; Aden, Singapore, Australia and South Africa. By 1970, however, Britain had, for all practical purposes, pulled its military forces out from East of Suez. It was in that context that Colombo, under Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, campaigned for an Indian Ocean Peace Zone which would ensure that neither littoral nor external powers would attempt to fill the resulting vacuum. This led, in 1971, at the 26th United Nations General Assembly, to the adoption of a resolution which designated the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

Meanwhile the concept of a Kra Canal has been gestating for two centuries with the Thais promoting it as a means of linking their eastern and westerns coasts. Almost a century ago, in the years before the Second World War, Tokyo became interested in such a canal because it would have given the Imperial Japanese Navy quicker and easier access to the Indian Ocean. And Tokyo still remains interested.

However, more recently it is Beijing that is promoting the Kra Canal as part of their global strategic paradigm: the Belt and Road Initiative. With Bangkok once again interested in this project, China may go on to construct the Kra Canal for the Thais.

Understandably, in the prevailing context, there is speculation that in the future Beijing may ensure sufficient control over the Canal to enable it to be critical in a time of conflict. The Kra Canal would then provide easy, certain and quick access to the Indian Ocean enabling the People’s Liberation Army Navy to secure China’s West Asian energy supplies.

China’s dependence on West Asian fuel

The author explains that Beijing is sensitive to its continued access to and passage across the Indian Ocean because of its dependence on fuel from West Asia. This concern is aggravated by Singapore’s control of their current access to the Ocean. The Kra Canal will therefore address Beijing’s current concern.

It will also address Beijing’s future concern, the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) which brings New Delhi together with Washington, Tokyo and Canberra. An alliance that could jeopardise Beijing’s access to its energy supplies in West Asia.

He sees New Delhi being compelled to respond to Beijing’s increasing and easier presence in the Indian Ocean. Hence Delhi’s transition from a Non Aligned foreign policy, to increasing strategic and military co-operation with Washington, Tokyo, Seoul and Canberra. An alliance which will “demand strong naval links with bases in countries like Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Singapore. This will be going back to the old SEATO (South East Asia Treaty Organisation) in practical terms.”

He speculates that while the US already has its multipurpose base in Diego Garcia at the epicentre of the Indian Ocean, it may need to secure a forward base, closer to the South Asian landmass, at Trincomalee.

The author sees the prospect of the construction of the Kra Canal as a critical development in the evolving rivalry that has emerged in the Indian Ocean. The Canal has the propensity to be both determined by this manoeuvring of powers both regional and global, as well as to drive the political future of the littoral states.