Features
Challenges to Pohottuwa in Geneva – I
By Austin Fernando
Due to pressure from the European Union, which has, in keeping with UNHRC resolution, in March 2021, decided to consider, the withdrawal of GSP+, action is pursued back home to adopt countermeasures. Justice Minister Ali Sabry has launched a website of the Office of National Unity and Reconciliation, and the Cabinet has approved policies and guidelines for the Office for Reparation, and the government opened an Office of Missing Persons (OMP) in Kilinochchi. Too little, too late!
However, the appointment of an Advisory Board, by President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to recommend and advise as regards what action should be taken in respect of the persons imprisoned or detained over terrorist activities, should be appreciated. Speculation is that some of the detainees may be released soon, as an initial response. The government seems to be softening its stand following the US Ambassador’s lunch with Minister Professor GL Peiris (PGLP) and MP MA Sumanthiran, which has loaded energy to sprint. MP Sumanthiran’s interest for the US to intervene, become the “third faction” (Daily News-.31-8-2021) also shows sprinting from the other end
Complaints that the government is using the Prevention of Terrorism Act to suppress people’s rights, and its alleged interference in judicial decisions will aggravate Sri Lanka’s problems in Geneva.
Commitments to UNHRC
The Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) committed to Transitional Justice (TJ) by unilaterally placing UNHRC Resolution 11/1 and co-sponsoring Resolution 30/1. These commitments matched the ‘Four Pillars of TJ/ Reconciliation’ – seeking truth, justice, reparation, non-recurrence. Its implementation was:
Establishing the OMP, and the attempt to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) through Cabinet Memorandum by PM Ranil Wickremesinghe (October 18, 2018), which failed with the ‘Constitutional Coup’ of October 26, 2018.
Study of Accountability Mechanism (AM) by a Working Group during the Yahapalana regime; no legislation was undertaken.
Yahapalana government establishing the Office for Reparation.
The expectation of non-recurrence through Constitution-making failed during the Yahapalanaya, and Pohottuwa looking forward to Romesh de Silva Committee.
The AM seems ‘dead’, though it is the most sought for, and alive among victims, their spokespersons, and internationals. Hence, AM will be addressed to understand its implications.
Accountability Mechanism
In terms of UNHRC Resolution 30/1, GOSL has acknowledged that accountability is essential to uphold the rule of law and build community confidence in the justice system. The GOSL proposed (30/1) to establish a judicial mechanism with a Special Counsel to investigate allegations of violations and abuses of human rights and violations of international humanitarian law. The credible judicial process included independent judicial and prosecutorial institutions and affirmed the importance of participation in a Sri Lankan judicial mechanism, including the Special Counsel’s office, of Commonwealth and other foreign judges, defense lawyers, authorised prosecutors, and investigators.
Yet, the AM has not been put in place by the nationalist Pohottuwa, and the undecided Yahapalanaya governments for political reasons. The victims, politicians, and the Diaspora demanded the AM on humanitarian and political grounds.
The unacceptability of the AM is based on several concerns:
(i) After the war victory, the soldiers deservedly became ‘war heroes. The terrorists who egregiously violated human rights and humanitarian laws were not affected by TJ, due to death, migration, etc. Therefore, a justifiable argument was put forth against prosecuting only military officers. The UNHRC wanted action against every violator.
(ii) Many are those who claim that the AM proposal is an attempt by the Diaspora and LTTE supporters to launch a witch-hunt against the military. We overlooked that our international friends also support accountability, as recently expressed by Lanka-friendly Lord Naseby when inquired (Pathfinder Foundation Zoom Meeting) whether he precluded ‘war crimes investigations’ having quoted the White Flag incident.
(iii) Even a deadlock could happen if the soldiers do not respond to AM summons. Such a situation could bring the military and the judiciary on a collision course. An AM, that is put in place with the ground reality being factored in, will fail.
(iv) There are two schools of thought as regards TJ: the ‘legalists’ and ‘realists.’ The ‘legalists’ argue prioritising judicial accountability to promote sustainable peace. In contrast, ‘realists’ argue for the prioritisation of restorative justice, for example, TRCs or Reparation Offices. Some question the UNHRC’s preoccupation with the ‘legalist’s viewpoint’.
(v) Existing domestic legal provisions conflict with AM implementation.
(vi) Overall, it was politically unsound.
Validation of AMs
Public validation of AM was orchestrated by Prince Zaid Al Hussein, the former UNHRC’s High Commissioner at a press briefing in Colombo. He declared: “Virtually every week provides a new story of a failed investigation, a mob storming a courtroom or another example of a crime going unpunished. Sexual violence and harassment against women and girls are particularly poorly handled by the relevant State institutions — especially when the alleged perpetrators are members of the military or security services — and, as a result, it remains all too widespread.” This had made the UNHRC suggest international participation in AM, he said. The Tamil Diaspora’s and victims’/ spokespersons’ mindsets remain unchanged even today.
Another view was that alleged violators would be hauled before the International Criminal Court. At the briefing, Prince Hussein declared that it was not expected, and difficult, probably knowing our ability to muster a veto at the UN Security Council.
Answering a journalist, Prince Hussein affirmed that the UNHRC wished that any decision-making was the sovereign right of Sri Lankans. He cautioned that whatever the recommendations, we must finally make victims feel that justice had been delivered to them. This balancing act is one of the challenges before PGLP.
As for TJ, no order was given for establishing any institutions. Hence, first establishing the less controversial TRC, OMP, and Reparation Mechanism, allowing the public to understand the non-destructive nature of TJ was preferred. But, for political popularity, the victims’ spokespersons thought differently and demanded AM.
Prince Hussein wished the AM was established according to Sri Lankan laws. Most of the majority community members detested the establishment of AM. The victims called for an AM to severely punish the military personnel, and they ignored the LTTE’s crimes. Some legalists spoke of the potentiality of worst consequences such as universal jurisdiction if TJ is disrespected.
I quote an Attorney justifying an accountability process, as anticipated by the UNHRC. She argued:
(i) A credible accountability process against those most responsible for violations and abuses of human rights and humanitarian laws will safeguard the reputation of those, including within the military, who conducted lawfully.
(ii) An accountability process is essential for non-recurrence, as unredeemed violence is one of the greatest contributory factors for recurrence.
(iii) The only way to prevent recurrence is by combating the causes of conflict, which can be done only through a process that properly addresses past violations.
(iv) The GOSL needs to fulfill its constitutional obligation to investigate and prosecute past crimes. To renege on that will not only taint the credibility of the GOSL in the eyes of the international community, but it will also erode public confidence instilled in the government concerning its commitment to uphold human rights, including combating impunity.” (Sri Lanka’s Time to Try: Editors – Dr. Isabelle Lassee/ Zahabiya Husain [SLTT] Page 135: ‘Dealing with the past’: Prashanthi Mahindaratna)
Her arguments are difficult to counter and were repeated. I quote Attorney Achala Seneviratne: “By punishing real criminals we create an opportunity to prove that we do not favor criminals because they are war heroes. Hiding criminals make the whole military criminals.”
Additionally, Mahindaratna stated the existing legal means. Quote:
“In fact, in terms of the Commissions of Inquiry Act, the Attorney-General is permitted to institute criminal proceedings solely based on the findings of a commission of inquiry appointed under the said Act, and in terms of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CCP), a police officer is required to ‘forthwith’ communicate to the magistrate having jurisdiction, or to his superior, ‘any information which he may have or obtain respecting’ (a) the commission of or attempt to commit any offense; (b) a sudden or unnatural death or death by violence; and (c) recovery of a dead body where the cause of death is unknown. Thus, by law, the police are required to initiate an investigation into an alleged crime upon learning of its commission by whatever means. As such, the oft-repeated justification for inaction that a criminal investigation could be initiated only where there is a formal complaint filed by a complainant is without merit.” (Ibid: Page 122).
Though this validation is acceptable, literature speaks negatively about its operability. Quote:
“While some international observers believe the new government (2015) should be generously afforded the time and space to develop its own mechanisms, the reality is that Sri Lanka’s record of domestic accountability throughout its post-independence history has been characterized by a lack of political will, lack of capacity, political interference, and chronic failure. To expect victims to put their trust in familiar domestic mechanisms that have failed time and again is unfair and unwise.” (SLTT- Page 139: ‘A hybrid court: Ideas for Sri Lanka – Rhadeena de Alwis and Niran Anketell).
The Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers (June 2017) also noted serious drawbacks in our judicial mechanism. It highlighted: “… the inadequacy of the constitutional jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; lack of independence of the judiciary; lack of clear and transparent process for the appointment of judges, AG, and State Counsels; and the language barrier in making justice accessible to the Tamil community.” (SLTT – page 108: ‘Extraterritorial Prosecutions and Transitional Justice: Seeking Criminal Justice in and outside Sri Lanka’- Kalika Metha, Raquel Saavedra, Andreas Schuller)
Mahindaratna also quoted previous instances where justice had not been served, for example, Black July, JVP insurgency, the killing of journalists like Richard Zoysa, Lasantha Wickramatunga, lethargy on bringing to book Bond Scam perpetrators, the ethnic cleansing of the Muslims, no-action against Kumaran Pathmanathan, Kattankudy mosque attack and killing of 600 policemen in Kalmunai. (SLTT: Pages 123-125t). The foregoing proves that legalists are not partisan to any political or ethnic, or religious group when discussing accountability. As such, any government that does not accept the legalists’ standpoint is likely to play into the hands of the UNHRC.
Recent events
It appeared that de Alwis and Anketell agree with Mahindaratna’s thinking. The issue is that with such legal provisions being in place because investigations, prosecutions, and punishments do not follow. Instead, some recent events exhibited legal laxity.
The pre-Geneva pressure is still on from those such as the parents of the eleven youth, allegedly abducted and made to disappear allegedly by the Navy Intelligence. The parents have filed a complaint against the Attorney General (AG) for action taken to temporarily not proceed with the case against a former Navy Commander. (Morning Leader – August 13, 2021). However, the latter has reportedly obtained an interim order. This is the parents’ initial step, certainly not expecting success.
The second step was taken concurrently, seen from the statement of the Regional Director of Amnesty International, Yamini Mishra (ibid.). The issue has left our shores, on way to Geneva! Mishra claimed: “Since Sri Lanka has the world’s second-highest number of enforced disappearances this case was an opportunity for the Sri Lankan authorities to deliver justice for crimes under international law, by ensuring that those reasonably suspected of criminal responsibility, including those implicated for aiding and abetting and acting under the principle of command responsibility, are brought to trial.” Mishra endorses Attorneys Mahindaratna and Seneviratne.
Without a trial, Amnesty has prejudged ‘reasonable suspicion on the crimes’ ‘aiding and abetting’ and ‘command responsibility.’ Not being a lawyer, I refrain from commenting on factual legal nuances but agree with Amnesty’s principle that Sri Lanka’s commitment to ‘deliver justice’ could be established by court inquiry. It will show judicial integrity and genuineness.
Incidentally, Resolution 46/1 of March 23, 2021, under item 6 stated: “accountability for crimes and human rights violations in ‘emblematic cases. This is an ‘emblematic’ case, like Trinco Five and ACF Killings. Certainly, Amnesty International is helping the UNHRC Geneva to argue that total immunity is granted by quoted action, and, therefore, the onus is on the UNHRC to rachet up the pressure. Over to PGLP!
Foreign judges, special prosecutors
The most sensitive issue is adjudication by non-citizens. Some have interpreted Resolution 30/1 wording, arguing that foreign judges don’t need to mandatorily adjudicate; others fear compulsory adjudication. Some have contended that there are no legal constraints for it. They are of the view that no reference is made to citizenship under the Constitution – Article 107 in the appointment of the Supreme or Appeal Court Judges. However, Constitution – Article 107(4) and Judicature Act – Section 6(2) require Supreme Court or Appeal Court judges and Primary Court judges respectively to take and subscribe to the prescribed oath or affirmation, at appointment. It is assumed foreigners would not do so.
Jurisprudential pronouncements of the Supreme Court infer that a ‘Sri Lankan judicial mechanism’ cannot be manned by a non-citizen. The quoted judgment is Edward Francis Silva vs. Shirani Bandaranayaka, where the Court remarked the appointment of a non-citizen judge lacks qualification.
Constitution – Articles 31 and 91 state that citizenship is required for the appointment of the Executive and Parliamentarians. Citizenship is not an issue for enjoying certain rights under Article 10, torture (Article 11), equality (Article 12), and freedom from arbitrary arrest or detention (Article 13). Freedom of speech, assembly, and association under Article 14 is guaranteed only to citizens. The Constitution stipulating citizenship for Executive and Legislature appointments, being silent on the judiciary, permits space to argue that foreigners could be appointed to the judiciary. Contrarily, one may argue if citizenship is a requirement for the Legislature, a judge adjudicating Legislature’s actions should be a citizen.
Article 151 (3) of the Draft Constitution – 2000 specifically stated that citizens and Attorneys at Law must be appointed to the Judiciary. However, the absence of this constraining qualification in the 1978 Constitution and twenty amendments thereto weakens the argument for disqualifying foreigner appointments to the judiciary.
The 20th Amendment empowers a Dual Citizen President with the power to appoint judges. A Dual Citizen can become a Premier or legislator. In that spirit, one could argue that Dual Citizens could be appointed as judges. Opening for PGLP.
De Alwis and Anketell have discussed international experiences in the appointment of judges in Special Courts. Certain foreign Special Courts have appointed a higher number of non-citizen judges (Sierra Leone, Lebanon) and some lesser number (Cambodia). It would have happened due to the non-availability of judges qualified in international law and practice, and the same argument is raised here too. Some disagree. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the composition of judges was changed from original over time. At the commencement (2005), each panel comprised two international judges and one national judge and in 2008 it was reversed. This gives a lead if foreign judges are engaged. Since foreign experts have served in Udalagama and Paranagama Commissions, similar service to AMs is justifiable. (Part II of this article will appear tomorrow)