Artificial Intelligence: Are we getting into it with our eyes open? – Part II

by Prof. Janendra De Costa

Senior Professor and Chair of Crop Science, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Peradeniya

How prepared is Sri Lanka for AI?

With the initiative coming from the very top, it is likely that AI will come to the fore at least in the official documents on development strategy and policy in the near future. As promised by the Minister of Education, AI is likely to make its way in to school curricula as well. Being an election year, there is a good possibility that the manifestos of all mainstream political parties in Sri Lanka will carry statements about promoting AI. Therefore, it is pertinent to ask whether Sri Lanka has the pre-requisites for successful adoption of AI in its key sectors and whether AI can be included in the school curricula from next year onwards. While confessing to be a non-expert in AI, my view, as an educator, researcher and a practitioner of Science is that Sri Lanka needs a substantial effort to first build a foundation for successful adoption of AI.

First and foremost, Sri Lanka lacks the human capital, an adequate number of trained personnel and practitioners in AI. The considerable exodus of experts in computer science and related technologies since the 2022 economic collapse and its repercussions in the aftermath have left the country significantly impoverished in terms of expertise in almost all established disciplines. The scarcity of experts would be even more acute in new, emerging disciplines such as AI. When the President and the Minister of Education talks about including AI in the school curricula, it is doubtful whether they have considered the availability adequately trained teachers to teach AI in schools or whether there has been adequate preparation in terms of computer facilities, textbooks (printed or electronic) and other learning resources.

Secondly, the past record of adopting new, emerging technologies in Sri Lanka tells us that the tendency will, most probably, be to adopt AI tools developed elsewhere with algorithms trained on data collected elsewhere. Only a small minority of the Sri Lankan experts is likely to take the considerably more difficult pathway of developing our own AI tools and training them on data collected specifically in a Sri Lankan context. As mentioned earlier in this article, the big, comprehensive data sets on which to train AI algorithms do not exist at present in most of the key areas where AI could make a significant positive contribution to national development of Sri Lanka. With the present and past levels of government investment on R & D in S & T (Sri Lanka with only 0.1% of its GDP invested in Science and Technology ranks among the lowest in the world in this index), there is little hope that there will be adequate and sustained support to develop our own AI tools to tackle the specific development needs of higher priority to Sri Lanka. The argument that why spend so much to develop our own AI tools when those already developed elsewhere are available will readily come from the government officials, especially those in the treasury, who have little understanding of how advancements in S & T take place via R & D.

Sri Lanka’s previous experiences in adopting new, emerging technologies

While we are about to embark on a journey to integrate AI into our national agenda, it is worth noting how similar initiatives in the past to integrate new, emerging technologies have fared. In this regard, the story of nanotechnology is especially relevant and offers valuable lessons. Nanotechnology in Sri Lanka was first promoted around 2005 as a technology that carried enormous promise for Sri Lanka to propel itself to the next level economic development via production of globally competitive nanoproducts. The initiative was spearheaded by the newly appointed Minister of Science and Technology, who was himself a former scientist and a former director of a state-sector research institute. The argument at the time was that Sri Lanka should invest its limited financial, infrastructural and humany resources on R & D in a few high potential areas rather than spreading it across all disciplines. Nanotechnology and biotechnology were the high-potential areas that were identified. The Sri Lanka Institute of Nanotechnology (SLINTEC) was established with state-of-the-art facilities on par with those available in developed countries and a select group of scientists from Sri Lanka and a few expatriate Sri Lankan scientists were employed on remuneration packages which were far superior to that enjoyed by the scientists in state sector R & D institutions. The initial funding came from a public-private partnership between the government and a few private sector organizations. It is worth noting that to provide its share of the venture, the National Science Foundation, the premier government organization that was funding S & T research in Sri Lanka diverted all its allocation for research from the treasury to the SLINTEC, thereby depriving research funding to all other areas of Science and Technology for a few years. To cut a long story short, today, after nearly 20 years, the expected nanotechnology boom along with the globally-competitive nanoproducts and the projected increase in the national GDP have not materialized while the SLINTEC, with all its state-of-the-art facilities barely survives, struggling to sustain itself financially, with all its expatriate Sri Lankan scientists gone back to their adopted countries and almost all Sri Lankan scientists who were employed initially having left for universities, in Sri Lanka and abroad. The most notable achievement of SLINTEC during this period was the development of a urea-based nanofertiliser, which when applied to the soil had the capability to release nitrogen slowly, thus facilitating its uptake by plant roots with minimum losses due to leaching. However, the US patent of this product, which was developed with a significant contribution of public funds of the Sri Lankan government was sold to a foreign company in a transaction, the details, and conditions of which are still not transparent to the general public. Ironically, after having spent so much on developing a nanofertiliser of its own, Sri Lanka had to spend another huge sum of public money to purchase a liquid nanofertiliser during the ill-fated 100% organic agriculture drive. Like the 100% organic agriculture project, the imported liquid nanofertilizer turned out to be largely ineffective.

The lesson that can be learnt (for those who are willing to learn) from Sri Lanka’s experience to adopt and promote nanotechnology is that successful and widespread adoption of a new technology is not possible without first establishing a broad base of R & D expertise and infrastructure in an adequately wide range of disciplines and applications. Establishing a centralised institute, however well-equipped, will not be sustainable in the long run and will not make a significant impact on national development. The adoption of biotechnology in Sri Lanka, which emerged as a discipline of high promise to Sri Lanka in the 1990s, is marginally better though nowhere near the level required to boost the national economy. When the present Minister of Education was holding the portfolio for Technology and Research under a previous administration, there was a proposal by a few academics close to him to establish a well-equipped Centre for biotechnology along the same lines as SLINTEC. The present author, as a member of the National Science and Technology Commission (NASTEC) at the time, advocated establishment of several biotechnology research groups in key areas of its applications and supporting them through equipment and other resources rather than spending on establishing one big Centre. This advice fell on deaf ears and the proposal went ahead but stalled when the Minister left his portfolio. This is illustrative of many initiatives in Sri Lanka, especially related to Science and Technology, which come from the top (i.e. the politicians). These proposals often come with a ‘sell-by-date’, which is either the next election or the period of the politician in charge of the specific Ministry. It is important to take into account all these historical facts and learn lessons from them when embarking on this new initiative to promote, develop and adopt AI.

Concluding remarks

There is no doubt that AI has the potential to bring about significant positive impacts in several key sectors of the Sri Lankan economy and many facets of the day-to-day life of the Sri Lankans. However, it is important to understand that realization of that enormous potential of AI, which is already happening in the developed world4,7, requires a substantial investment from within Sri Lanka to educate itself on the strengths and limitations of AI and develop, as much as possible, AI tools of its own or adopt those developed elsewhere only after rigorous validation within the Sri Lankan context. Adequate precautions are required to address the inherent limitations of AI, formulate and implement safeguards against the risks and illusions posed by AI and to guard against total reliance on AI once it gains the trust of its users1,5. In particular, measures are needed to prevent the loss of creativity in future generations of Sri Lankans, especially the students and other learner groups, who are highly likely to be hooked on AI tools in their learning process.

Additional Reading

1. Why scientists trust AI too much – and what to do about it. (Editorial). Nature, 627: 243. 14 March 2024. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-023-06221-2.

2. Alvarado, R. (2023). What kind of trust does AI deserve, if any?. AI and Ethics, 3(4): 1169-1183. https://doi.org/10.1007/s43681-022-00224-x.

3. Carroll, J. M. (2022). Why should humans trust AI?. Interactions, 29(4), 73-77. https://doi.org/10.1145/3538392.

4. Krenn, M. et al. (2022). On scientific understanding with artificial intelligence. Nature Reviews Physics, 4(12): 761-769. https://doi.org/10.1038/s42254-022-00518-3.

5. Messeri, L. & Crockett, M.J. (2024). Artificial intelligence and illusions of understanding in scientific research. Nature, 627: 49-58. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-024-07146-0.

6. von Eschenbach, W.J. (2021). Transparency and the Black Box problem: Why we do not trust AI. Philosophy & Technology, 34: 1607–1622. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13347-021-00477-0.

7. Wang, H. et al. (2023). Scientific discovery in the age of artificial intelligence. Nature, 620: 47-60. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41586-023-06221-2.

The writer is a Fellow of the National Academy of Sciences of Sri Lanka and has been an academic and a research scientist in Agriculture and Natural Sciences for over three decades while being based in Sri Lanka.